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INTRODUCTION
The origins of this Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on
institutional reform (the "Intergovernmental Conference" or "IGC 2000") lie in the Protocol on the
institutions, annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.  As the Amsterdam Treaty was unable to resolve all
the institutional issues regarded as prerequisites for enlargement, provision was made for
convening a new IGC in order to carry out a comprehensive review, before the European Union
had more than twenty members, of the provisions of the Treaties relating to the composition and
operation of the institutions.
It was the European Council  which decided in Cologne, in June 1999, to convene the IGC with the
aim of completing its work by the end of 2000.  It specifically stated that the agenda should cover
the size and composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council, the possible
extension of qualified majority voting in the Council as well as other necessary amendments to the
Treaties arising as regards the European institutions in connection with these three issues and in
implementing the Amsterdam Treaty.  After confirming that brief the Helsinki European Council
called upon the Presidency to examine whether there were grounds for proposing the inclusion of
other items on the Conference agenda.
The Conference began on 14 February 2000.  Political responsibility for the negotiations was
entrusted to the Ministers in the General Affairs Council and the preparatory work was carried out
by a group of government representatives, with the participation of a Commission representative
and two European Parliament observers.  The proceedings were based on documents prepared by
the Presidency with a view to shaping the debate and on contributions from Member States,
institutions and bodies.  The Presidency would like to place emphasis on the importance of the
contributions from the Commission and the European Parliament, with the latter having asserted
its point of view through its resolutions and statements, through the constructive dialogue with its
President and through the full participation of its observers in the discussions.  For the sake of
transparency, all official documents of the Presidency, the Member States and the other institutions
and bodies as well as the other official contributions to the proceedings of the Conference have
been made available to the public via the Internet 1.
                                                
1 http://db.consilium.eu.int/cig/
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In accordance with the conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, the Presidency has organised
meetings with representatives of the applicant countries in order to inform them of progress and to
provide them with the opportunity to state their points of view on all the questions discussed by the
Conference.  Information on the progress of the Conference has also been provided to the Member
States of the European Economic Area.
This report, drawn up under the Presidency's responsibility, takes stock of progress to date.  It is in
two parts.  The first summarises progress on all the issues discussed, setting out the major positions
emerging from the preliminary discussions and a more accurate definition of the main options open
with a view to a final compromise.  The second part collates the draft texts, specific suggestions as
to paths to be explored and tables setting out certain options.  Aware of the political sensitivity of
some subjects dealt with in the second part, the Presidency wishes to point out that it merely
involves contributions to the discussion, and these cannot under any circumstances be regarded as
formal proposals binding on the present or future Presidency or on the other delegations.
It is already clear from the various chapters of the report that there are a number of questions
which will have to form part of the final agreement, whilst others warrant more detailed
examination before deciding whether or not they should be taken into consideration.  Finally, yet
other ideas do not appear to have sufficient support, at least thus far, to be taken on board in the
present exercise.
It is generally accepted that there cannot be any partial results, since the overall balance can be
evaluated only in the context of a comprehensive solution at the end of the negotiations.  The result
is that this report cannot record formal agreement at this juncture on any of the points under
discussion and that some positions are still fairly divergent, since the final deadline is still too far
ahead to be a source of pressure.  The discussions have, however, made it possible to analyse in
depth the main political questions, to outline the parameters for a possible compromise and clearly
to define the scope of what is at stake, so that the Conference can enter into the final stage on solid
bases that will enable it to finish in December 2000, in line with the timetable laid down.
Introduction
CONFER 4750/00 dey/MS/mc 7
DQPG EN
Faced with the challenge of virtually doubling membership of the Union, it seems indispensable
that the Conference adopt at an early date reforms which will, in the future, ensure the efficiency of
the institutions of the Union while preserving its legitimacy as a Union of States and peoples and
the fundamental balances and originality of an enterprise that has shown its worth over fifty years.
It is also recognised that those reforms should be coupled with some changes to the working
methods of all the institutions which do not necessarily require amendment of the Treaties.  That
internal reform, which is already in hand, should be continued actively beyond the end of the
current IGC so that the new Member States can be smoothly incorporated into the Union.
The definition of a common security and defence policy and the preparation of a draft Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union are being examined in parallel outwith the IGC fora.
The Presidency is submitting to the European Council a separate  report on the common European
security and defence policy.  As regards the draft Charter of Fundamental Rights, the procedure for
its preparation and official proclamation will continue in accordance with the Cologne conclusions.
Taking into account the mood gauged in informal discussions on the question of closer cooperation,
the Presidency feels that it should put to the European Council a proposal designed to include the
question in the future proceedings of the Conference so that the provisions introduced by the
Amsterdam Treaty can be re-examined.
It is not the purpose of this Intergovernmental Conference to address, still less to settle, the debate
launched elsewhere on the goals of the Union and the future of its institutions, a debate which will
no doubt continue over the next few years.  However, by opening an in-depth discussion on a
number of sensitive issues and trying to find solutions which measure up to the challenges now
facing us, this Conference is contributing to the process of constant adaptation of the institutions
and the way they operate, without which the Union's immediate future, and, still more, its long-term
future would be compromised.
°
°      °
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1.  THE COMMISSION
1. The Commission is a lynchpin of the Union's institutional system.  It is the guardian of the
Treaties, required to act completely independently in the general interest, and as such it has a
right of initiative which is exclusive in Community matters, but shared in other areas; its
duties include management, mediation and negotiation.  On all these counts, there is a
general consensus that in an enlarged Union there will be a need to maintain and build upon
the Commission's legitimacy and efficiency and its credibility in the eyes of the public,
although opinions vary as to how to achieve these ends.
2. This Chapter deals with:
• the size of the Commission in an enlarged Union;
• its internal organisation;
• other questions raised during the proceedings, in particular the political accountability
of the members of the college (individual or collective).
A. Size of the Commission in an enlarged Union
3. The Commission operates on the principle of collective responsibility, with all Members
taking collective responsibility for its proposals and decisions – this is in order that
Commission action taken in the general interest of the Union should have the full legitimacy
required by its important institutional role.  The Commission currently consists of
20 Members, including its President, "chosen on the grounds of their general competence and
whose independence is beyond doubt".  It "must include at least one national of each of the
Member States, but may not include more than two Members having the nationality of the
same State"; there are currently two Members from Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain,
France and Italy.
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4. The number of Commissioners is one of the central questions for the Conference, identified in
the Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement, which establishes a link
between this issue and the weighting of votes within the Council (see next Chapter).  With the
exception of the status quo – which is not ruled out in some quarters, should there be
disagreement on other matters such as the weighting of votes in Council – there are two
different approaches to the problem, each with a number of variants:
First option: A college made up of one national from each Member State
5. Most delegations consider that this is the only way of safeguarding the Commission's
legitimacy in the eyes of the public.  A good way of making sure that Commission initiatives
and decisions are acceptable is for Commissioners to be able to highlight the various
sensitivities to be taken into consideration when defining the common interest.  Furthermore,
an increased number of Members is quite compatible with the aim of efficiency if it is borne in
mind that the College will have a greater workload and if its internal organisation is
rationalised by suitable means.
6. Other delegations hold that a Commission made up of one national from each Member State
would raise objections of principle, in that it would be contrary to the Commission's very
nature, as an independent, collegiate body whose Members do not represent  States, and also
practical objections, as having too many Members would inevitably detract from the
efficiency and consistency of Commission action.
Second option: A college made up of a limited number of Commissioners, however many
Member States there are in the Union
7. The delegations which argue for this option point out that a Commission with a limited
number of Commissioners is the only way of abiding fully by the spirit of the institutions,
whereby the Commission is intended as an independent, collegiate body, whilst at the same
time ensuring that it can act consistently and effectively, something which would not be
possible in a college of thirty-odd members that was more of a debating chamber than an
executive body.
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8. The other delegations pointed out that a Commission which did not have one national from
each Member State would find its legitimacy and the acceptability of its decisions seriously
undermined, which could not fail to detract from its effectiveness too.
9. Without prejudice to these positions of principle, the Conference discussed what
arrangements could be made – assuming the second option were adopted – to ensure that
Member States were treated equally.  This equality might take two forms:
– either in terms of the choice of members, giving responsibility to the Commission
President for choosing Commissioners, in particular on merit, while taking care to keep
a degree of balance between Member States over time;
– or in terms of actual presence in the college; this would involve laying down the
composition of the college for future terms of office in advance, or laying down the
principle that the difference between the total number of terms of office held by
nationals of any given pair of Member States may never be more than one.
Many felt that the second option was the only way by which the principle of equality could be
fully respected.
o
o o
10. It seems difficult to reconcile these two approaches at present.  However, it is generally
acknowledged that it is important to avoid temporary or partial arrangements that would
leave the problem unresolved until a subsequent decision, taken at the end of the enlargement
process.
11. Some delegations emphasised that any solution to this question would depend on the overall
balance of the final compromise covering all the matters dealt with by the Conference, in
particular the weighting of votes in Council and the allocation of seats in the European
Parliament.
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B. Internal organisation of the Commission
12. In conjunction with the debate on the size of the Commission, the Conference addressed the
issue of its organisation and internal structure, which some felt would be a problem in any
event, however many Commissioners were finally decided on.  The discussions yielded three
options, which could also be combined, to help ensure that the Commission worked properly:
(a) increasing the President's powers, for example by giving him particular responsibility
for directing the Commission's general policy line and more authority vis-à-vis the
other Members (casting vote, allocation of portfolios, etc.);
(b) creating additional posts for Vice-Presidents, in order to bring their number up to 6
or 8 in all, who could coordinate the Commission's activities in given areas;
(c) the possibility of creating Commissioners without portfolio (with the same voting rights
as the other Commissioners), who would be assigned coordination tasks or given
special responsibilities by the President.
13. Quite apart from delegations' positions of principle on the size of the Commission, the
discussions revealed a great willingness to move towards the above types of reform, with
some preference for increasing the President's role and creating more Vice-Presidents.
However, differences remained on whether these new provisions should be included in the
Treaty (and if so, in what degree of detail) or whether it would be preferable to leave the
Commission, particularly its President, maximum latitude in deciding these matters for itself
when forming the college.  In addition, it was pointed out that, if some of the reforms were to
accentuate – de facto – the functional hierarchy between Members of the Commission (an
increased number of Vice-Presidents or the creation of Commissioners without portfolio),
there would need to be appropriate measures to ensure that there was no discrimination
between Member States.  The majority of delegations felt that the emergence of a hierarchy
should not under any circumstances result in two categories of Commissioner being created.
Part I – Chapter 1: The Commission
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C. Other Commission-related issues raised during the preparatory proceedings
14. Apart from the main issue of the size and composition of the Commission, the Conference
considered other possible adjustments to the Treaties, in particular on the accountability of
members of the college (individual or collective).
Motion of confidence
15. Following suggestions put forward by some of the delegations in order to strengthen the
Commission's political position, the Presidency tabled the draft text in Annex 1.1; this would
authorise the President of the Commission, with the support of the college, to ask the
European Parliament for a vote of confidence.  The suggestion was received with interest,
although a number of delegations did not wish to state their final positions until they had
considered in more detail how such an innovation would affect the current balance between
the institutions; in this connection, some delegations wondered whether the Commission's
right to ask for a vote of confidence from the European Parliament should not go hand in
hand with a right of dissolution; others pointed out that, in the interests of maintaining the
balance between institutions, the Commission should be able to seek a vote of confidence from
the European Council.
Individual accountability of Members of the Commission
16. While the Commission, as a college, is accountable to the European Parliament – the
Parliament is able to pass a motion of censure – the Treaty does not provide any way of
holding individual Members of the Commission to account.  It is fairly widely acknowledged
that making Members of the Commission individually accountable to the European
Parliament, the European Council or the Council is hardly to be reconciled with the principle
of collegiality, whereby all the Commissioners are responsible for all decisions adopted by
the Commission.  The same cannot be said of accountability to the President himself.  There
was widespread approval of the initiative taken by the current Commission President, who
had asked for and obtained a commitment from each Member of the Commission to resign
should he ask them to do so.  Conversely, delegations were still very divided on whether to
include a formal procedure for this purpose in the Treaty.
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Clarification of Treaty provisions in the event of resignation of Commission Members
17. The voluntary resignation of the entire college in March 1999 gave rise to a certain amount
of debate on the need to clarify the provisions of the Treaty on the resignation of Members of
the Commission and their obligations after leaving office.  However, the Conference's
discussions showed broad agreement that the current provisions of the Treaty had enabled the
crisis to be managed without any insurmountable problems, that an event of this type was
quite exceptional and that at any rate, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to lay down
Treaty provisions to cope with every possible eventuality.  In the course of its consideration of
this matter the Conference nevertheless found that a number of clarifications, of limited
scope, might usefully be added to Article 215 (see Annex 1.2).
__________________
Part I – Chapter 2: Weighting of votes in the Council
CONFER 4750/00 dey/MS/mc 17
DQPG   EN
2.  WEIGHTING OF VOTES IN THE COUNCIL
1. Under the current system of weighting of votes, the number of votes of each Council member
reflects the relative population size of the relevant Member State, not in absolute, linear terms
but in accordance with a formula of highly degressive proportionality resulting from a
political agreement, with Member States which have a more or less comparable population
size placed in categories which have the same number of votes 1.  With each successive
enlargement, new Member States have been classified in categories in accordance with that
same principle.  The necessary threshold to achieve a qualified majority, which has remained
virtually unchanged through the years, is in the region of 71% of the total votes.
2. The Protocol on the institutions annexed to the Treaty explicitly refers to the possibility of
modifying the weighting system, whether by reweighting or by a dual majority.  It links this
issue to that of Member States giving up the possibility of nominating a second Commissioner
(see the previous Chapter).  In its conclusions the Cologne European Council meeting
specifically referred to these issues as topics for examination by the Conference, as well as
the threshold for qualified majority decisions.  Declaration No 50 annexed to the Final Act of
Amsterdam stated that the "Ioannina compromise" 2 would be extended until the entry into
force of the first enlargement and that, by that date, a solution for the special case of Spain
would be found.
3. Declaration No 50 annexed to the Final Act of the Amsterdam Treaty stated that the
"Ioannina compromise" would be extended until the entry into force of the first enlargement
and that, by that date, a solution would be found for the special case of Spain.
                                                
1 See the present weighting table of the Union of 15 Member States in Annex 2.1.
2 See page 24 below.
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4. Although delegations' opinions are still divergent on the nature of the solution to be adopted
(between a dual majority and reweighting proper), discussions  have nevertheless brought to
light a degree of convergence on the following:
• any weighting system must reflect the dual nature of the Union, which is both a Union of
States and a Union of peoples;
• irrespective of the option chosen, the future system of weighting of votes in the Council
must be equitable, transparent, efficient and easily understood by citizens;
• in order to ensure its legitimacy, any qualified majority must comply with a minimum
threshold expressed in terms of population, which must in any event be more than 50%,
with opinions diverging as to the specific figure to be adopted;
• there is a political link between the weighting of votes and other questions dealt with by
the Conference, such as the size of the Commission or the apportionment of European
Parliament seats, with the result that a satisfactory outcome to this issue can be attained
only under a balanced overall compromise;
• the weighting system should not make it more difficult for a decision to be taken within
the Council.
5. The Conference discussions on this aspect of the reform brought to light three issues which
are analysed below:
•  the choice between a dual majority and reweighting;
• the qualified majority threshold;
• the time at which the new method should apply.
Part I – Chapter 2: Weighting of votes in the Council
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A. Dual-majority system
Principle
6. The dual-majority system involves setting a double threshold expressed as:
• a number of Member States or weighted votes, and
• a percentage of the total population of the Union 1,
with adoption of any measure being subject to simultaneous compliance with both conditions.
7. Delegations in favour of the dual majority felt that it had the advantage of clearly reflecting
the dual nature of the Union, as a Union of States and also a Union of peoples, of being
readily comprehensible and of applying to all configurations of the Union, without
necessitating adjustments to guarantee the requisite degree of democratic legitimacy every
time there was an enlargement.  These delegations felt that the presence of a majority of
Member States in any qualified majority (which has always been the case so far) was
essential for the legitimacy of Council decisions.
8. The other delegations held that the dual-majority system constituted a radical change in
relation to the spirit of the original system of the Community, would be difficult to apply in
practice and might well complicate decision-making in that a dual condition would have to be
met in order to assemble a qualified majority; in this context some delegations took the view
that the requirement for any qualified majority to include a majority of Member States was
not acceptable in an enlarged Union because it carried an increased risk of deadlock;
application of this rule might create a blocking minority that represented only
approximately 10% of the population of the Union.
                                                
1 See Annex 2.3 for a reference table for calculating population weight under a dual-majority system.
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Variants
9. Three possible variants of the dual-majority system were identified in discussions:
(a) The "simple" dual majority, based on the following two parameters:
– a minimum number of Member States, which could be half, a majority or a higher
figure (for example 60%), as mentioned by certain delegations;
– a minimum percentage of the total population of the Union; figures of between
50% and 60% were mentioned during discussions.
This variant is illustrated in Annex 2.4.
(b) The "weighted" dual majority, involving:
– maintaining the current weighting scale, to be extrapolated linearly for
subsequent accessions in line with the table in Annex 2.2;
– verifying that a minimum population threshold, at a level to be defined
(between 50% and 60%), was met for each qualified majority.
This variant is illustrated in Annex 2.5.
(c) The "reweighted" dual majority:
In addition to setting a minimum population threshold, this variant, which is derived
from (b), would entail reweighting in favour of Member States with the largest
populations, to an extent to be determined.
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B. A new weighting of votes
Principle
10. Under a system of vote weighting in the strict sense of the term, the number of votes of each
Member State reflects the relative size of its population, not in absolute, linear terms as under
a dual-majority system, but using a degressive proportional formula resulting from a political
assessment, an arithmetical calculation or a combination of the two.
Variant 1: An essentially political approach derived from the present system
11. For some delegations, maintaining the current system in tandem with substantial reweighting
of votes would be the only way of compensating Member States for loss of a second
Commissioner while ensuring that the qualified majority respects a minimum population
threshold sufficient to halt the erosion of democratic legitimacy of decision-making observed
over the years 1.
12. While not opposed to the principle of reweighting, several delegations consider that the
operation should be limited in scope and should merely compensate those Member States
which waive the possibility of appointing a second Commissioner, in line with the undertaking
given in Amsterdam, without calling into question the general balance of the current system.
These delegations also highlighted the need to take account of the link between reweighting
and co-decision, in that the latter was in itself a form of reweighting because of the relatively
greater weight of the more populous Member States in the allocation of seats in Parliament.
                                                
1 The minimum threshold of population represented by a qualified majority was 67,71% in the Union of 6 in 1958,
then 70,49% (EU-9 in 1973), 70,14% (EU-10 in 1981), 63,27% (EU-12 in 1986) and 59,83% (EU-12 after
German reunification) and currently stands at 58,18%.
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13. The delegations opposed to reweighting pointed to the political difficulties which would
inevitably have to be faced in negotiations on scale of the exercise and on any adjustments to
the categories of Member States.  A majority of delegations also pointed out that beyond a
certain reweighting threshold, the qualified majority would no longer include half of the
Member States (as had always been the case so far), which to their mind would be damaging
to the legitimacy of the Union's decisions and might sideline States with the smallest
populations.
14. Without prejudice to these basic positions, the Presidency felt that this option could usefully
be fleshed out in the form of tables illustrating two possible reweighting models:
(a) model 1 (see Annex 2.6), giving a simulation based on an approach suggested by the
Presidency during the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations in 1997;
(b) model 2 (see Annex 2.7), based on the following hypotheses:
– doubling the votes of all Member States in order to extend the possibilities for
differentiating between Member States should that prove necessary in subsequent
negotiations;
– Member States waiving a second Commissioner would be allocated 5 additional
votes, thereby maintaining the minimum threshold for a qualified majority
expressed in population terms at around the current level.
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Parameters
15. If a basically political approach were taken to the reweighting of votes, the following
parameters would have to be defined by the Conference:
(i) the extent of reweighting, which would among other things determine the minimum
population weight of any qualified majority.  For some, the figure should be set
between 50% and 60%.  Others stood out for a figure above 60%, as the threshold had
been approximately 63% in the Community of 12 in 1986;
(ii) reweighting to apply only to Member States waiving a second Commissioner's post or
not;
(iii) the extent to which groups of Member States with the same number of votes are
homogeneous and the case for reviewing grouping criteria;
(iv) the minimum number of Member States represented by a qualified majority.  The
current system entails a qualified majority always involving at least half of the
Member States; the question is thus whether that should continue to be the case either
as an arithmetical consequence of the system itself or in the form of a rule expressly
embodied in the Treaty.
Variant 2: A purely arithmetical approach
16. Annex 2.8 illustrates an approach giving each Member State a number of votes equal to
double the square root of its population expressed in millions of inhabitants, rounded off to
the nearest figure.  The delegation which put forward this approach said that it would have
the advantage of being completely transparent while preserving in practice a system based on
groups of Member States and allowing for reweighting in order to maintain a population
threshold more or less in line with the current level.  It would have the added advantage of
adjusting automatically to future Union enlargements.
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C. The qualified majority threshold
17. Under a system based on weighting of votes, the majority threshold determines the ease with
which decisions can be taken by the Council.  Since the creation of the Community, that
threshold has remained at around 71% of votes, although the existence of the Ioannina
compromise 1 since January 1995 and of Declaration No 50 attached to the Final Act of the
Amsterdam IGC must  be borne in mind.
18. Initial discussions on this subject have highlighted the concern not to render decision-making
more difficult and hence to hold to the current threshold in principle.  However, the point was
made that the issue should also be seen in the light of the undertakings entered into on all
sides in Amsterdam regarding the Ioannina compromise and the specific situation of Spain,
on which appropriate action should be taken.
D. Entry into force of any change to the system of vote weighting
19. Some delegations take the view that the effects of reweighting should logically be spread over
time in line with successive configurations of the Union.  Conversely, others consider that the
system of vote weighting should be changed in a single operation – either on the first
enlargement or on entry into force of the revised Treaty – by taking into account all applicant
States, thereby obviating any further adjustments during later enlargements.
                              
                                                
1 "If members of the Council representing a total of 23 to 25 votes indicate their intention to oppose the adoption
by the Council of a decision by qualified majority, the Council will do all within its power to reach, within a
reasonable time and without prejudicing the obligatory time limits laid down by the Treaties and by secondary
legislation, such as those in Articles 189b and 189c of the Treaty establishing the European Community, a
satisfactory solution that can be adopted by at least 65 votes.  During this period, and with full regard for the
Rules of Procedure of the Council, the President, with the assistance of the Commission, will undertake any
initiatives necessary to facilitate a wider basis of agreement in the Council.  The members of the Council will
lend him their assistance."
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3.  EXTENSION OF QUALIFIED
MAJORITY VOTING (QMV)
1. Experience shows that use of qualified majority voting gives impetus to the negotiating
process by promoting compromise and ultimately making for easier decision-taking.  It is
generally accepted that, given the increased number of Member States after the next
enlargement, there is cause for examining possible extension of qualified voting to forestall
possible blockages, particularly in areas which are essential to the proper operation of the
Union.  In the opinion of many, this could even be one of the determining factors for the
success of the Conference.
2. There is a consensus view that any extension of qualified majority voting must be carried out
within the limits of the Union's powers, and that it is not the purpose of this Conference to
modify those powers.  It is also generally accepted that a number of constitutional or
quasi-constitutional questions intrinsically call for unanimity and should not come into the
qualified majority frame (see Annex 3.7).  As a final point, a number of delegations have
indicated that the outturn of the extension of qualified majority voting should, as with the
other questions submitted to the Conference, respect a certain balance between the varied
interests of Member States.
3. In the light of the above, the Conference has examined two types of provisions:
(i) articles of the Treaty where straightforward transition to qualified majority voting
could be considered;
(ii) articles where straightforward transition to qualified majority is precluded on account
of their complexity or political sensitivity, but which contain specific provisions eligible
for qualified majority voting subject to rewording of the text.  Particular instances are:
taxation, social provisions, the environment, certain aspects of external economic
relations and certain questions covered to date by Article 308.
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A. List of articles to be examined for straightforward transition to qualified
majority voting
4. The Presidency has drawn on the ideas adumbrated in the Finnish Presidency's report and
endeavoured to develop a pragmatic approach which is a half-way house between
case-by-case examination and acceptance of the principle that qualified majority voting will
henceforth be the general rule.  The approach involves identifying those categories of articles
in the Treaty giving good grounds for qualified majority treatment,  e.g. the existence of a
close link with the internal market or with areas already under qualified majority voting (the
budget, for instance).  Applying that approach, Annex 3.1 to this Chapter contains a list of
thirty-nine provisions which should continue to be given serious consideration for transition
to qualified majority treatment, although the Presidency is aware that some of them touch
upon areas of great political sensitivity.
5. In the light of the suggestions put forward by the Presidency, discussion revealed three broad
trends:
• while reserving the right to state a final position on details of the list at a later date, a
majority of delegations felt that the logical, pragmatic approach suggested by the
Presidency formed a sound starting-point for further proceedings;
• some delegations regretted that the Presidency had ruled out establishing qualified
majority voting (subject to limited exceptions) as the voting rule with the Council; to
their mind, the Presidency's approach was somewhat lacking in ambition and had the
disadvantage of removing out of hand from the Conference's ambit articles which also
merited qualified majority treatment;
• others took the opposite view that, although the list drawn up by the Presidency did
have the advantage of allowing case-by-case examination, it was over-ambitious in
incorporating a number of articles where transition to qualified majority would meet
with virtually insurmountable political reluctance.  The main difficulty was that,
following the series of extensions of the scope of qualified majority voting resulting in it
becoming the rule for a large number of Council decisions, those articles still subject to
unanimity were naturally the most politically sensitive.
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B. Provisions for which a move to qualified majority voting can be
considered only for certain specific, clearly defined aspects
Taxation
6. Because of the particular political sensitivity of the matter, the Presidency suggested a very
prudent approach based on a rewording of Article 93 of the TEC (see Annex 3.2) which
– lays down the principle that unanimity continues to be required for both direct and
indirect taxation,
– defines a very limited list of specific, precisely-defined measures for which the
introduction of qualified majority voting could be considered,
– and clearly establishes that measures henceforth subject to qualified majority voting
cannot affect, either directly or indirectly, matters which still require unanimity.
7. The provisions in question are closely linked to the internal market (e.g. measures intended to
avoid double taxation or non-taxation of cross-border income, measures to combat fraud and
tax avoidance or measures to modernise or simplify existing Community rules).  A move to
qualified majority voting is also suggested for tax measures whose sole aim is environmental
protection.
8. The following initial reactions emerged from the discussions:
• several delegations – while reserving their final position – thought that the Presidency's
suggestion went in the right direction because it endeavoured to delimit as precisely as
possible and without any ambiguity the areas to which the qualified majority could
apply in future; some of them suggested being even more specific in order to preclude
any risk of broad interpretation;
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• some delegations could agree to extending the qualified majority to all or to the bulk of
tax provisions because, inter alia, of the close link between taxation and the operation
of the internal market;
• others emphasised the need to keep unanimity for the entire tax field, both for reasons
of principle – inasmuch as taxation reflected the basic policy choices of the national
legislator in economic and budgetary matters – and for practical reasons since, no
matter how precisely they were formulated, the Presidency's suggestions would not
preclude problems of interpretation and thus disputes.  These delegations also stressed
the difficulties inherent in any attempt to recast the Treaty provisions on taxation while
avoiding – as was their aim – any extension of Community powers in this area.
Social provisions
9. In the social field, the Presidency suggested three amendments for consideration by the
Conference (see Annex 3.3):
– the first would delete Article 144, a suggestion which met with broad agreement;
- the second would bring Article 42 of the TEU on freedom of movement for workers
under qualified majority voting because of, firstly, the close links with the internal
market and, secondly, the particular value of QMV in an area like this which is
frequently being adapted;  the text in annex also sets out the exact scope of Article 42 by
including a reference to self-employed persons;
– the third would apply QMV to a limited number of specific measures referred to in
Article 137, because of the connection with other provisions on freedom of movement or
with provisions on which there is already QMV.
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10. As on all of the chapter, delegations reserved their final positions; however, at this stage:
• several delegations intimated that they were prepared to examine the Presidency's
suggestion in a positive frame of mind, for there was every justification for it at a time
when there was a general desire to promote the social dimension of the Union; some
were prepared to go even further and move to QMV for the whole of Article 137;
• others, however, counselled the greatest caution because of the deep differences
between Member States as regards the philosophical, legal and financial conception of
their social welfare systems, which made this a matter of particular political sensitivity;
some also pointed out that the unanimity requirement was not a real obstacle where the
need for Community action was clear, as evidenced by the extensive legislation which
already existed in the area.
Environmental provisions
11. There is fairly general agreement on the need to clarify the wording of the environmental
provisions to ensure that the texts do not contain ambiguities or are not open to interpretation
(see Annex 3.4).  However, some delegations advocated the utmost caution because of the
political sensitivity of the matter and wondered whether the suggested amendments would not
create more difficulties than they solved.  Others, on the contrary, think that the Presidency's
suggestions are too limited and that the scope of QMV should be extended to all
environmental issues without exception.
12. It was also suggested the taxation aspects of the environment be dealt with in Article 93 (see
new wording of Article 93 in Annex 3.2).
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External economic relations
(a) Mixed agreements
13. Under current practice an agreement to be concluded with a third State on matters partly
within the competence of the Community and partly within the competence of the Member
States is the subject of a single "mixed" instrument signed jointly by the Community and the
Member States and, before it is concluded, is submitted for ratification under national
procedures as regards those provisions which come within the competence of the Member
States.  This practice has two disadvantages:
– it means that the qualified majority rule which is often applicable to the bulk of the
provisions of a 'mixed' agreement cannot be used as the whole text has to be adopted by
common accord;
– the failure of one or more Member States to ratify the provisions of the agreement
which come within their competence means that the agreement as a whole, including
those provisions which are within Community competence, cannot come into force and
that such provisions cannot be provisionally applied.
14. To remedy this situation the Conference examined a solution whereby the Treaty would
specify that provisions which fall within Community competence would be the subject of a
separate agreement dealing exclusively with these Community matters, with the other
provisions appearing in an agreement to be concluded in parallel by the Member States or by
the Union in the case of political dialogue (see Annex 3.5).  Interest was expressed in this
approach by some delegations who see it as a way of making it easier to take decisions in
external relations.  Others drew attention to the risk that this approach might complicate the
negotiation of such agreements, since it would be more difficult to strike a balance between
the Community component and the component within the competence of the Member States.
Others pointed to the danger that third countries might see it as prejudicial to the coherence
of the Union’s external action.  Lastly, some expressed doubts about the added value of such
an approach inasmuch as it is already possible in practice.
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(b) European Union participation in the work of the WTO
15. Because issues discussed within the framework of the WTO are partly within the exclusive
competence of the Community and partly within the competence of the Member States, the
common position of the Union generally has to be adopted by common accord which, as
experience shows, involves a risk of deadlock, which can only get worse with future
enlargements.
16. To overcome this difficulty the Conference examined two possible solutions:
Option 1
Agree that any decision to transfer competence to the Community to negotiate and conclude
international agreements on services and intellectual property will henceforth be taken by
qualified majority (see Annex 3.1, point 17).  This solution is stoutly defended by several
delegations but meets with equally strongly held objections of principle from other
delegations, on the grounds in particular that it would involve a transfer of powers to the
Community.  With regard to the effective application of the qualified majority, the question
was raised whether the Treaty could explicitly consolidate the rule arising from the Court of
Justice’s case-law on AETR.
Option 2
Set out, in a Protocol to the Treaties, clear, simple, transparent and effective rules of
procedure so that a common position in the WTO could be established by qualified majority
in all cases including areas within the competence of the Member States 1.  The Conference
examined a draft text along these lines (see Annex 3.5) which elicited the interest of some
delegations, while others, although they accept the principle that such rules should be
established, expressed misgivings about whether they should be incorporated in the Treaty.
                                                
1 This is not a precedent.  Under the Lomé Convention, decisions on the partial suspension of the Convention are
taken by qualified majority even in areas involving the competence of the Member States.
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17. It follows from the foregoing that opinions on this issue are still divided.  However, the
general aim of underpinning the effectiveness of the decision-making process in this area was
recognised and there was broad agreement that the Conference should continue to examine
the various suggestions on the table – and possibly new suggestions – in order to assess the
practical and legal effects.
Areas currently covered by Article 308 of the TEC
18. Article 308 of the EC Treaty is used for the adoption of acts or measures within the existing
competence of the European Community for which there is no specific legal basis.
Experience has shown that in certain areas (in particular the creation of decentralised
agencies with legal personality and with a mandate to pursue one of the objectives of the
Treaty; economic, financial and technical cooperation with non-DC third States; and the
energy sector) frequent use has been made of that Article.  The question was raised whether
the repeated use of the Article in those areas would not justify the creation of new specific
legal bases – without any transfer of competence – for which use of the qualified majority
could be envisaged.
19. While opinions are still divided on whether new specific legal bases should be established, it
was clear from the discussions that there is a degree of willingness to examine this suggestion
further, particularly as regards the creation of specialised agencies and economic, financial
and technical cooperation with non-DC third States.  Draft Articles on these two questions
are set out in Annex 3.6 to this Chapter.
________________________
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4.  THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
1. Developments in the process of European integration have resulted in the regular increase in
the powers of the Parliament linked to a general need to reinforce the democratic legitimacy
of the Union.  Thus the Maastricht Treaty saw the European Parliament become a
co-legislator alongside the Council in important issues, the list of which was further extended
by the Amsterdam Treaty, at the same time that the codecision procedure itself was amended
so as to place Council and Parliament on an equal footing; the Parliament's role in the
nomination and political control of the Commission was also reinforced.
2. With the prospect of the next enlargement there is a broad agreement that the effectiveness of
the European Parliament should be preserved inter alia by continuing to cap the number of
seats while ensuring appropriate representation for the peoples of the Member States.  There
is also some inclination towards further extending co-decision combined with simplifying and
rationalising the legislative process in general so that it retains its effectiveness and is made
more readily intelligible to citizens.
A. Allocation of seats in the European Parliament
3. There is broad agreement that the number of seats should not exceed 700 and that the
allocation between Member States should take account of the dual nature of the Union – both
a Union of States and a Union of peoples.  However, there are differences of view as to the
method to be applied, which can take two forms.
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First approach
4. The current system of allocation would be extrapolated to the new acceding States and the
number of seats given to each Member State would be reduced in linear fashion to remain
within the threshold of 700, with a correction to ensure a minimum level of representation for
the States with the smallest populations, so that the various political forces are represented
(see Annex 4.1).  Supporters of this formula stressed that the existing mode of allocation
already makes provision for a proportional representation of the population (in degressive
form).  Some of them said that the introduction of an additional element of proportionality
could be justified only if the current IGC pushed the Union a step along the path to
integration which went far beyond current ambitions.
Second approach
5. This is the method of calculation submitted by the European Parliament, which proposes
allocating each of the Member States a minimum of four seats and distributing the remaining
seats according to a scale directly proportional to the population of each Member State (see
Annex 4.2).  Delegations in favour of this approach said that it was the only way to ensure
that the penalty which, to their mind, results from the existing system to the detriment of the
Member States with the largest populations – already deemed to be excessive – was not
further aggravated with the arrival of new Member States.
o
o o
6. The discussion showed that other variants could be imagined by varying, inter alia, the
minimum threshold of Members to be reserved for each Member State.  In this connection,
several delegations pointed out that the whole problem of the allocation of seats in the
Parliament was linked to other questions under discussion in the IGC, in particular the
weighting of votes in the Council.
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B. Transitional provisions for the application of the ceiling and the new allocation of seats
7. It is generally accepted that any solution involving withdrawal of a Member's mandate during
the term for which he/she was elected must be avoided.  In this context two possibilities were
examined for adjusting the allocation of seats as and when the enlargements take place:
• either two successive adjustments in 2004 and 2009, an approach favoured by a
majority of delegations, provided that there are two possible variations:
– ex-ante adjustments, in the light of the foreseeable accessions (States that had
signed an Accession Treaty), thus avoiding any overrun of the 700-seat threshold;
– ex-post adjustments, in the light of the accessions that had taken place in the
meantime, even though this might entail a temporary overrun of the 700-seat
threshold, since the possibility of such an overrun is accepted by many
delegations.
• or a single adjustment:
– in 2004, which would take account of the final composition of the Union in the
light of the current applications; this would avoid any overrun of the 700-seat
threshold;
– in 2009, on the basis of the accessions that had actually taken place by that date.
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C. Legislative role of the European Parliament
Co-decision procedure
8. There was agreement that the procedure itself, as described in Article 251, should not be
amended.
9. As to the scope of co-decision, most delegations - while willing to consider some extension -
thought the matter should be examined by the Conference at the same time as the question of
the extension of qualified majority voting.  It was observed that, while there might be a link
between co-decision and the need for qualified majority voting, the reverse (i.e. that qualified
majority voting in the Council entailed, ipso facto, a co-decision procedure) was not
necessarily true.  To assist the discussions, the Presidency has drawn up a list of provisions
concerning which a changeover to co-decision could be considered by the Conference in
parallel with its discussions on the extension of qualified majority voting and in the light of
the outcome of those discussions (see Annex 4.3).
Cooperation procedure
10. In the interests of simplifying and rationalising the Union's decision-making process, a large
majority of delegations favoured abolishing the cooperation procedure (Article 252), on the
understanding that the choice of a replacement procedure for the four provisions in question
(see Annex 4.4) still remained open: many took the view that the cooperation procedure
should be replaced by consultation of the European Parliament; others thought the co-
decision procedure should be required.
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Legislative act
11. The Conference discussed a particular aspect of the general problem of the hierarchy of
norms on the basis of a proposal from the Presidency, which envisages the creation of a new
category of acts that could be designated "legislative act".  After the discussion, the Legal
Service was asked for a study paper on this subject, the main points of which are that:
– the constant increase in the number of co-decision procedures and the workload thereby
imposed on the European Parliament and the Council suggest that the concept of
legislative act should be clarified, with the emphasis on defining the general principles,
basic elements and objectives of Community legislation rather than on technical details
that are more appropriate to acts covered by a lighter procedure;
– this development would correspond to the institutional and legal practice of all the
Member States, where a distinction is made between acts affecting the essential aspects
of a subject covered by a cumbersome procedure in which the national parliaments are
fully involved and implementing measures covered by a lighter procedure;
– retaining the current practice could, with the next enlargement, impair the quality of
legislative work owing to the proliferation of procedures and the lack of time;
introducing certain hierarchy of acts would have the advantage of ensuring greater
comprehensibility of the Treaty and greater transparency of the decision-making
procedure for the ordinary citizen;
– one of the objections to such an approach has questioned the practical possibility of
establishing within the Treaty a line of demarcation between provisions under
legislative acts and those that come under the heading of "implementing measures": this
objection could be overcome if the Treaty was confined to encouraging the institutions
to proceed in that direction without establishing demarcation criteria (these would
emerge, case by case, from the legislative debate itself).
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12. Annex 4.5 contains two suggested amendments to the Treaty (in the form of options) which
illustrate this approach.  On an initial examination there were slight variations in the
reactions to them: several delegations were interested in what they saw as a first step towards
clarifying and rationalising the Union's legislative activity, with a certain preference for
option 2; others, without underestimating  the value of the approach, were concerned that it
would come up against practical problems of implementation and affect the institutional
balance.
13. It was agreed that, because of the importance of the subject and its numerous implications,
the discussion should be continued so that all of its practical, legal and institutional aspects
could be looked at.
_____________________
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5.  THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
1. Since the establishment of the European Communities, the Court of Justice has played an
essential role in the development of law.  The Community's judicial system has enjoyed
considerable success.  However, the growing number of cases before the Community courts
and the prospect of an enlarged Union mean that changes to the structure and operation of
the system are required.  This is a generally shared view and so the discussions are
concerned with the details and not the principle of the reform.
2. This Chapter sets out:
– the guidelines that have been welcomed by all delegations;
– the reform guidelines that might be acceptable after further negotiation;
– some ideas that have aroused the interest of certain delegations but have not led to any
final positions;
– a number of matters that have not yet received sufficient study.
A. Reform guidelines welcomed by all delegations
3. All delegations agree that it is necessary to provide as of now – during the reforms to be
introduced concerning the procedures for amending the provisions governing the Court of
Justice (hereafter "CJ") and the Court of First Instance (hereafter "CFI") – for a sufficient
degree of flexibility so that, in the future, adjustments can be made to the new circumstances
that enlargement will bring, without any need for a cumbersome procedure of amendments to
the Treaty.  A satisfactory solution would be to give suitable powers to the Council, which
would act on the basis of unanimity or qualified majority according to circumstances.
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4. In line with this way of thinking, the Protocol on the Statute of the CJ, which could be
amended by the Council acting unanimously (Article 245(1)), should incorporate the
provisions which, by their nature, are out of place among the provisions of the Treaty (cf. the
references to the Statute contained in Articles 221, 222, 223, 225, 225a and 236).  The Statute
should also incorporate Council Decision 88/591/ECSC,EEC,Euratom of 24 October 1988
establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities 1.
5. This concern for flexibility also led delegations to accept the qualified majority rule for the
Council's approval of the Rules of Procedure of the CJ and of the CFI (Article 245(2)
and (3)).
6. As to the composition and operation of the CJ and the CFI, there was almost unanimous
agreement on the following amendments:
– the number of judges participating in the CJ's plenary session should be limited so that
it does not become an assembly (Article 221);
– it should not be compulsory for Advocates-General of the CJ to intervene in all the
cases before the CJ; the number of Advocates-General should be stipulated in the
CJ Statute (Article 222).
7. There was fairly broad agreement that the number of CJ judges should equal the number of
Member States (Article 221) so as to ensure that all legal traditions and systems existing
within the Union were represented.  One delegation reserved its position on this approach.
8. Delegations were in favour of creating specialised judicial boards of appeal, particularly for
staff matters and for actions arising from the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market
in Alicante.  The Council would be given the power to create them (Articles 225a and 236).
                                                
1 OJ L 319, 25.11.1998, p. 1.  Decision last amended by Council Decision 1999/291/EC, ECSC, Euratom of 26
April 1999, OJ L 114, 1.5.1999, p. 52.
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9. There was a consensus on making provision for appeals to the TFI – which could, moreover,
change its name – against decisions taken by these Boards of Appeal.  The Council should
also be given the power to provide for such appeals by means of the procedure for amending
the Protocol on the Statute of the Court of Justice (Articles 225a and 236).
B. Reform guidelines that might be acceptable
10. The following guidelines received fairly broad support from most delegations; however, some
of them expressed reservations, believing that further negotiation was needed:
– amendments concerning the powers of the Court of Justice regarding questions
submitted for a preliminary ruling in connection with visas, asylum, immigration and
other policies relating to the free movement of persons (Article 68);
– connection between the various levels of jurisdiction – relationship between the CJ, the
CFI and the boards of appeal (Article 220);
– determination of cases where the Advocates-General would intervene at both the Court
of Justice and the CFI (second paragraph of Article 222);
– determination of direct actions or proceedings for which the CFI would have
competence (Article 225(1));
– the possibility of giving the CFI competence – in clearly specified areas and by way of
exception – to hear and determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling (first
subparagraph of Article 225(2);
– either the introduction of a "preliminary examination" by the Court of Justice of
questions for a preliminary ruling on which the CFI would be able to hear and
determine, or the introduction of a "corrective mechanism" that would enable the CJ to
ensure case-law consistency where the CFI was competent to hear and determine
certain questions referred for a preliminary ruling (second subparagraph of
Article 225(2);
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– the Commission's right of initiative in certain procedures – determination of the direct
actions and areas of questions referred for a preliminary ruling which are assigned to
the CFI (Article 225(3)), creation, composition and operating procedures of the boards
of appeal (Article 225a) and amendment of the Statute (Article 245(1));
– the rule (unanimity) for adopting certain Council acts – determination of the direct
actions and areas of questions referred for a preliminary ruling which are assigned to
the CFI (Article 225(3)), creation, composition and operating procedures of the boards
of appeal (Article 225a) and composition and operating procedures of the board of
appeal for Community staff (second paragraph of Article 236); the last two provisions
can be combined in the same Article.
C. Ideas considered to be of interest
11. A number of ideas put forward by various delegations were deemed to be of interest but did
not at this stage gain the support of all delegations.  They are as follows:
– the need for the Treaty to give details of the "Grand Chamber" (Article 221, option B);
– the need for the Treaty to give details of the election of presidents of chambers and the
duration of their term of office (Article 223(2));
– amending Article 230 to give the European Parliament legal capacity on an equal
footing with the Council and the Commission;
– amending the third paragraph of Article 230 to include the Committee of the Regions
and "federal entities with legislative powers";
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– amending Article 300(6) to enable the European Parliament to ask the CJ for an
opinion as to whether an agreement that the Community envisages concluding with a
third country is compatible with Community law;
– establishment of a legal basis allowing specialised courts to be set up in future, whose
decisions would be subject to appeal before the Court of Justice, following the example
of the CFI.
D. Issues for further consideration
12. Some issues have not yet been discussed but should be considered in future.  These include in
particular certain aspects relating to the Boards of appeal, such as their composition and
how they operate – at least in outline – and the procedure used to adopt their rules of
procedure.  These aspects are closely linked to the issue of how the various levels of
jurisdiction should interact.
____________________
Chapter 6: The other institutions and bodies
Part I – Chapter 6: The other institutions and bodies
CONFER 4750/00 sse/PT/lpd 45
DQPG EN
6.  OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES
1. The Conference discussed the changes that might be made to the other institutions and
bodies.  The discussion showed that there was overall support for maintaining the status quo,
apart from a few adjustments mainly concerning the size of the consultative bodies and,
secondarily, their role.
A. The Court of Auditors
2. The role of the Court of Auditors is to consider the legality and regularity of the Union's
income and expenditure and to ensure its sound financial management.  The Court of
Auditors consists of 15 members appointed for a renewable term of six years.
Size, internal organisation and term of office of the members of the Court of Auditors
3. Most delegations consider that the Court should consist of one national from each Member
State in order to facilitate cooperation with the competent national audit bodies.  Others do
not share this point of view and have spoken in favour of retaining the current figure of
15 members, or indeed of reducing this figure to 12 in order to maintain the efficiency of the
Court's proceedings.
4. Most delegations were open to the idea of setting up chambers within the Court and enabling
the Court to draw up its own rules of procedure, with the exception – some pointed out – of
the rules governing languages.  Others feel that neither the need to set up chambers within the
Court nor the need to change the provisions on drawing up its rules of procedure have been
fully demonstrated.
5. As regards the length of the term of office of the Court's members, there is overall support for
maintaining the status quo, namely a renewable 6-year term.  However, a few delegations
would be willing to contemplate a non-renewable 9-year term.
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Protecting the Union's financial interests
6. A large majority of delegations considered that the provisions introduced at Amsterdam to
protect the Union’s financial interests are sufficient and that there is no justification for
amending Article 280 in order to establish an independent structure with the task of
adjudicating on the financial liability of officials or servants.  Other delegations emphasised
the importance, in general terms, of providing the Union with every means of ensuring that its
financial interests are effectively safeguarded, whilst reserving the right to consider the best
way of achieving this objective, including strengthening existing bodies such as OLAF.
B. The Economic and Social Committee
7. The Economic and Social Committee consists of representatives from the various categories
of the social and economic sectors.  It currently has 222 members (between 6 and 24 for each
Member State).  No ceiling on the number of members is laid down in the Treaty.
Size
8. Most delegations were in favour of setting an absolute limit on the number of Committee
members.  Some thought that this should correspond to approximately one half – others
approximately one third – of the ceiling for the European Parliament by means of a linear
reduction in the number of current members either with or without a set minimum on the
number of seats per Member State (see Annex 6.2 for an example of a linear reduction which
remains within the ceiling of 250 members).  However, a number of delegations were opposed
to introducing an absolute limit on the number of Committee members, favouring instead an
extrapolation of the number of Committee members based on the key currently used to
allocate seats (see Annex 6.1).
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Composition
9. Although a more satisfactory and balanced representation of the various socio-professional
categories and the different sections of civil society might be desirable, there was no
significant support within the Conference at this stage in favour of amending Article 257
along those lines (cf. Annex 6.3).
C. The Committee of the Regions
10. The Committee of the Regions is a consultative committee consisting of representatives of
regional and local authorities.  At present it has 222 members (between 6 and 24 from each
Member State).
Size
11. Several delegations were in favour of an absolute limit on the number of Committee members,
which should be calculated to ensure that the various regions of all the Member States are
adequately represented.  This limit should correspond to approximately one half – or one
third – of the ceiling for the European Parliament by means of a linear reduction in the
number of members (see Annex 6.2).  Other delegations seem to prefer an extrapolation of the
number of members based on the current allocation of seats (see Annex 6.1), believing that an
extrapolation of this kind would be the only means of ensuring that the regional dimension in
each Member State is properly represented, including after the accession of all the applicant
countries.  The possibility of using the same allocation key as that used to allocate seats in the
European Parliament was also mentioned.
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Composition
12. The large majority of delegations consider that the members of the Committee of the Regions
must hold a regional or local authority electoral mandate or be politically accountable to an
elected assembly (draft amendment to Article 263(1) in Annex 6.3).  Most delegations share
the view that Committee members who lose their electoral mandates should automatically
lose their mandates on the Committee of the Regions.  A few delegations expressed their
reluctance to agree to changes in the composition of the Committee of the Regions.
13. Suggestions were also put forward by one delegation for transforming the Committee of the
Regions into an institution and providing it with access to the Court of Justice.  These
suggestions have so far received only limited support.
D. Date of the entry into force of the changes
14. The large majority of delegations believe that changes with regard to the Court of Auditors,
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions should be introduced
gradually, as and when applicant States become members of the Union.
_____________________
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7. OTHER ISSUES
A. Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union
1. The Conference examined proposed amendments mainly involving the addition to Article 7 of
a procedure for determining the existence in a Member State of a threatened breach of the
principles laid down in Article 6(1).  Delegations' initial reactions to these suggestions relate
both to the issue of principle and to the procedure for implementing it.
2. As regards the principle, several delegations felt that a provision of this kind satisfied a
genuine need in the Union to supplement and to adjust the current arrangements under
Article 7 which involve the use of exceptional measures to deal with exceptional
circumstances; other delegations, however, remained rather sceptical, contending, on the one
hand, that the issue had been thoroughly discussed – and settle – at Amsterdam and that there
was thus no need to return to the subject now, and, on the other hand, that it was difficult –
 indeed impossible –to determine objectively the kind of circumstances in which this provision
would be required;
3. As regards the implementing arrangement, given the specific nature of the subject, some felt it
would be more logical not to weight Member States' votes; in addition, various opinions were
expressed as to which threshold should be set for decision-making (consensus minus one,
qualified majority, other kind of majority) and as to whether any provision should be made
for adopting measures at all, since what is involved is identifying a slight risk rather than a
clear breach of the principles in Article 6.
4. Without disregarding the slight differences between the delegations' positions, there was
clearly broad support for closer consideration of this issue; accordingly, the Presidency has
drawn up a text (see Annex 7.1) to facilitate further work on the subject which endeavours to
take account of the initial points emerging from discussions.
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B. Establishment of the Community position in a body which is set up under an
agreement with third States and which is required to adopt decisions having
legal effect
5. With a view to laying down a coherent procedure for establishing the Community position
each time decisions having legal effect have to be adopted by bodies set up under
international agreements, broad consensus was recorded on the draft amendment proposed
for the second and third subparagraphs of Article 300(2) in Annex 7.2, aligning the procedure
on that currently used for association agreements.
C. Presentation/organisation of the Treaties
6. Further to a request from the Commission, the Florence University Institute prepared a draft
reorganisation of the Treaties, which was sent to the delegations at the end of May and which
will be the subject of a Commission communication in July 2000.  This work dovetails with
the effort made at the previous IGC, which led to a draft merger of the TEU and the TEC
prepared by a group of experts.  As there is no Commission evaluation and a shortage of
time, the delegations have been unable to adopt a position on that new draft. However, it is
already generally agreed that, in view of both the technical nature of the matter and its
political sensitivity this work cannot, in any event, be concluded during the current
Conference.  It is therefore for the next Presidency to propose the necessary provisions, in
due course, for the discussion to continue in accordance with suitable arrangements and in
an appropriate framework.
D. Other questions raised by the Conference
7. The Conference considered other issues corresponding to general or specific concerns
expressed by the Member States and the institutions and bodies of the Union (see Annex 7.3).
It is generally agreed that at this stage of the discussions there are neither objective reasons
nor sufficient support to justify the inclusion of these issues in the Conference agenda, even if,
in some cases, their importance in further institutional discussions after the present IGC is
acknowledged.
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8. CLOSER COOPERATION
1. As a result of the recent informal discussions within the IGC, the subject of "closer
cooperation" is now regarded as part of the debate on institutional reform and the Presidency
officially proposes that this item be added to the Conference agenda.  To assist further
discussion of this matter, the Presidency believes that it would be useful to better define the
concept of closer cooperation and the different contexts it covers in order to examine, where
thought justified, how to facilitate closer cooperation in mutually acceptable conditions.
A. "Predetermined" closer cooperation
2. The model of closer cooperation which could be termed "predetermined" (Schengen or
EMU type of cooperation) is, at present, the only example of closer cooperation which has
actually been realised.  It is different from the "enabling clause" insofar as the arrangement
that applies (fields and terms) is contained in the Treaty itself, which allows for a "tailor-
made solution" according to the desired aim.  The counterpart to this facility would be the
need to proceed within the framework of the Treaty, i.e. in this case, before the end of this
IGC.  This raises the question of whether or not the Member States intend to propose using
the "predetermined" method of closer cooperation in certain fields during this Conference.
The following areas were mentioned during the discussions: security and defence; police and
judicial cooperation; industry; research; and the environment (for the promotion of specific
projects in the last case).  In all these cases, it would also be necessary to identify the aspects
of the areas in question, the objectives and the conditions in which closer cooperation would
be possible.
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B. Enabling clauses
3. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced such a clause in the first and third pillars of the Treaty
(possible, in the first case, following a proposal from the Commission and, in the second, by
the Commission delivering an Opinion).  During the discussion, two major trends emerged:
some thought that the current system should be maintained while others thought that a certain
degree of flexibility should be introduced in the models defined in Amsterdam.
4. The following arguments were put forward in support of maintaining the existing provisions:
− since these clauses have never been used and there has never been a concrete proposal to do
so, it seems premature, in the absence of any experience, to contemplate amending them at
this IGC;
− the possible amendments to the system continue to be regarded with considerable
apprehension by certain States, in particular the applicant states, where the scope for
systematic use of closer cooperation is interpreted as paving the way for future
fragmentation of the Union;
− the extension of qualified-majority voting introduced by revisions of the Treaties since the
Single European Act, including the revision that will result from this Conference, will
increasingly reduce the need to avail of closer cooperation, given the scope to adopt acts
with all the Member States in accordance with the usual Treaty procedures.
5. Other delegates saw a need to amend the existing provisions for the following reasons:
− the conditions for using these clauses are so strict that they preclude their use in practice;
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– the increasing heterogeneity of an enlarged Union would probably make it increasingly
difficult to obtain unanimity among the Member States to engage in closer cooperation;
– easier access to closer cooperation is the best way to deal with the temptation which
some Member States might have to develop cooperation outside the framework of the
Treaty which might compromise the cohesion of the Union's activities.
– closer cooperation must not be seen as a factor of fragmentation or dilution but, on the
contrary, as a factor of integration insofar as it sets more ambitious objectives to be
shared by all members.
6. Without prejudice to the diverging opinions, a debate began, primarily during the informal
meeting in Sintra, on how the conditions for using the enabling clauses might be relaxed
without, however, dispensing with the essential guarantees which ensure the legitimacy of
closer cooperation.
7. The initial discussions have shown that there are two ways of approaching the relaxation of the
current system:
(i) simplifying the procedure:
● dispensing with any procedure which could be treated as a veto (emergency
brake);
● reducing the minimum number of Member States currently required.
Differentiating the procedure in accordance with the number of requesting
Member States could also be envisaged, with a stricter procedure when a request
was submitted by less than half of the Member States; the possibility of
differentiating the procedure according to fields could also be examined;
● scope, in certain cases, to postpone the decision to allow a period for further
examination.
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(ii) simplifying the conditions in certain fields:
The hazards of closer cooperation for non-participant third parties and for the
consistency of EU policies vary according to the area in question.  The risk of distortion
is real in the case of regulatory activities directly or indirectly related to the internal
market; the risks are much lower for areas where the Member States already have a
certain degree of autonomy in decision-making or in the case of initiatives devoid of any
regulatory content (e.g. action programmes).  It is important therefore to ensure, as far
as possible, that the authorisation decision is not motivated by pure political expediency
but is rather the result of a two-sided debate based on objective elements.
8.   It follows from the above that:
● the conditions set for closer cooperation could be differentiated according to pillars
and fields so that rights which the Treaty accords to non-participants, notably in the
area of the internal market, are fully preserved, and that no artificial barriers stand in
the way of initiatives which, by their nature, cannot affect the interests of non-
participating Member States;
● the role of the Commission and the general requirement to give reasons should be
strengthened in whatever new procedure is adopted and that the open nature of the
models should always be preserved, on the basis of transparent and objective catch-up
conditions.
C.  Closer cooperation in the field of CFSP
9. Although mentioned on several occasions by different Member States, the issue of closer
cooperation under the second pillar was not really discussed at the Conference.  The
Presidency considers that the problem of closer cooperation does not arise in the same way for
the CFSP as it does for the policies falling under the first and third pillars.  The value and
strength of a common foreign policy is its unity and, on the face of it, the use of enabling clauses
which would allow separate initiatives seems somewhat incompatible with the desired result.
Moreover, the Treaty already contains provisions which introduce some flexibility where this
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might prove necessary, notably:
● Article 23(1), which offers a solution in a situation where a minority does not want to
participate in an EU measure by allowing that minority not to apply a decision, while at
the same time accepting that the decision commits the Union (constructive abstention);
● Article 17(4) on security/defence, which lays down that the Treaty shall not prevent the
development of closer cooperation between two or more Member States, provided such
cooperation does not run counter to or impede the cooperation provided for therein.
10. The question is whether it is desirable and possible to go beyond these sources of flexibility.
If we take as our premise the requisite unity of foreign policy, the Presidency considers that
closer cooperation might be conceivable where there is no specific manifestation of the policy
of the Union in the form of strategy, action or common positions but only a general obligation
to cooperate (pursuant to Article 12, fifth indent); indeed, it is possible to imagine this
cooperation, depending on the subjects and the circumstances, concerning only a particular
group of Member States without, however, contravening the obligations arising from the
Treaty.
11. If there is agreement with this analysis, an ad hoc enabling clause could be envisaged in the
field of CFSP.  That would mean determining the arrangements, aims and guarantees for
non-participants.  The Presidency believes that the need to maintain the overall consistency of
EU policy militates in favour of conferring upon the Commission some sort of special role for
closer cooperation in the field of CFSP, e.g. instigation in this area could be subject to its
assent.  The Commission should also be able to give its opinion, either on its own initiative or
at the request of a Member State, on the degree of compliance between the development of
closer cooperation and the approved aims.
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D. Other issues
12. Quite apart from the above points, it would be worth examining two other issues in relation to
the general problem of closer cooperation.  Firstly, the concept of "acquis" and its status,
both of which should be clarified, particularly in the case of predetermined forms of
cooperation such as EMU, and secondly, the problem of the institutional framework for
closer cooperation which involves fewer than half of the Member States.
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PART II
TEXTS, LISTS AND TABLES
ANNEXED TO THE PROGRESS REPORT 1
                                                
1 In the Annexes, text in normal font comes from the current Treaty text.  Proposed amendments are in bold.
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ANNEXES TO CHAPTER 1
THE COMMISSION
Annex I Motion of confidence
Annex II Clarification of provisions to apply when members of the
Commission resign
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Annex 1.1
Commission request for a motion of confidence
Draft new Article 214a
Following a decision by the Commission, the President may ask the European Parliament for
a vote of confidence on the basis of a general policy statement.  If the European Parliament
fails to pass a motion of censure pursuant to Article 201 within four days, the Commission will
be deemed to retain Parliament's confidence.
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Annex 1.2
Clarification of provisions to apply when
members of the Commission resign
Draft amendment to Article 215
Apart from normal replacement, or death, the duties of a Member of the Commission shall end
when he resigns or is compulsorily retired.
A vacancy caused by death or resignation shall be filled for the remainder of the Member's term
of office by a new Member appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States.
The Council may, acting unanimously, decide that such a vacancy need not be filled
In the event of resignation or death, the President shall be replaced for the remainder of his term
of office.  The procedure laid down in Article 214(2) shall be applicable for the replacement of the
President.
Save in the case of compulsory retirement under Article 216, Members of the Commission shall
remain in office until they have been replaced or until the Council has decided not to fill a
vacancy as provided for in the second paragraph.
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ANNEXES TO CHAPTER 2
WEIGHTING OF VOTES IN THE COUNCIL
Annex 2.1 Table of weighting and population for the existing Union of
15 Member States
Annex 2.2 1 Extrapolation of the current weighting system
Annex 2.3 1 Reference table for calculating population weight in a dual majority
system
Annex 2.4 1 Illustration of the "simple" dual majority system
Annex 2.5 1 Illustration of the "weighted" dual majority system
Annex 2.6 1 First illustration of possible reweighting in favour of the most
populated Member States
Annex 2.7 1 Second illustration of possible reweighting in favour of the most
populated Member States
Annex 2.8 1 Illustration of possible reweighting based on an arithmetical approach
                                                
1 These tables show the situation for a Union of 28 (including all the States with applicant status) and for a Union
of 27 (including only those applicant States with which accession negotiations have actually begun).
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Annex 2.1
Table of weighting and population
for the existing Union of 15 Member States
(1999 Eurostat Population Data)
MEMBER STATES VOTES POPULATION
/000
Germany 10 82 038
United Kingdom 10 59 247
France 10 58 966
Italy 10 57 612
Spain 8 39 394
Netherlands 5 15 760
Greece 5 10 533
Belgium 5 10 213
Portugal 5 9 980
Sweden 4 8 854
Austria 4 8 082
Denmark 3 5 313
Finland 3 5 160
Ireland 3 3 744
Luxembourg 2 429
TOTAL EU 87 375 325
Total Votes = 87 Votes % Votes Min. No (and %)of Member States
Min. % of
population
Qualified
majority
62 71,26% 8 (53%) 58,16%
Blocking
minority
26 29,89% 3 (20%) 12,38%
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Annex 2.2
Extrapolation of the current weighting system 1
(1999 Eurostat Population Data)
MEMBER STATES VOTES POPULATION/000
Germany 10 82 038
Turkey 2 10 64 385
United Kingdom 10 59 247
France 10 58 966
Italy 10 57 612
Spain 8 39 394
Poland 8 38 667
Romania 6 22 489
Netherlands 5 15 760
Greece 5 10 533
Czech Republic 5 10 290
Belgium 5 10 213
Hungary 5 10 092
Portugal 5 9 980
Sweden 4 8 854
Bulgaria 4 8 230
Austria 4 8 082
Slovakia 3 5 393
Denmark 3 5 313
Finland 3 5 160
Ireland 3 3 744
Lithuania 3 3 701
Latvia 3 2 439
Slovenia 3 1 978
Estonia 3 1 446
Cyprus 2 752
Luxembourg 2 429
Malta 2 379
TOTAL EU of 28 144 545 566
TOTAL EU of 27 (without Turkey) 134 481 181
Union of 28 Member States
Total Votes = 144 Votes % Votes Minimum number (and %)of Member States
Minimum % of
population
Qualified majority 102 70,83% 14 (50%) 51,36%
Blocking minority 43 29,86% 5 (17,9%) 10,45%
Union of 27 Member States
Total Votes = 134 Votes % Votes Minimum number and (%)of Member States
Minimum % of
population
Qulaified majority 96 71,64% 14 (51,85%) 50,20%
Blocking minority 39 29,10% 4 (14,81%) 10,50%
                                                
1 Maintaining and extrapolating the current weighting of votes including all the candidate States.
2 Estimated figure cited in the Commission's opinion (source: national/IMF).
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Annex 2.3
Reference table for calculating population weight
in a dual majority system
This table 1 makes it possible to check whether or not the population criterion is met for any variant
on the dual majority.
MEMBER STATE POPULATIONWEIGHT (EU-28)
POPULATION
WEIGHT (EU-27)
Germany 150 169
Turkey 118 –
United Kingdom 109 123
France 108 123
Italy 106 120
Spain 72 82
Poland 71 80
Romania 41 47
Netherlands 29 33
Greece 19 22
Czech Republic 19 21
Belgium 19 21
Hungary 18 21
Portugal 18 21
Sweden 16 18
Bulgaria 15 17
Austria 15 17
Slovakia 10 11
Denmark 10 11
Finland 9 11
Ireland 7 8
Lithuania 7 8
Latvia 4 5
Slovenia 4 4
Estonia 3 3
Cyprus 1 2
Luxembourg 1 1
Malta 1 1
TOTAL EU 1 000 1 000
                                                
1 The reference figures within the total of 1 000 will change with each enlargement in the light of the percentage
of the Union's population represented by each Member State as the configuration of the Union changes, or
whenever there is a substantial change in percentage for one or other of the Member States.
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Annex 2.4
Illustration of the "simple" dual majority system
In this illustration the two conditions needed for a qualified majority are:
• a majority of Member States
• a minimum population threshold of 58.2% 1
Union of 28 Member States
Number (and
%) of votes
Population weight
(Annex 2.3)
Minimum % of
population
Qualified majority 15 (53,57%) AND 582 58,2%
Blocking minority 14 ( 50,..) OR 419 2 10,45%
Union of 27 Member States
Number (and
%) of votes
Population weight
(Annex 2.3)
Minimum % of
population
Qualified majority 14 (51,85%) AND 582 58,0%
Blocking minority 14 (51,85%) OR 419 2 11,62%
                                                
1 i.e. the minimum population currently represented by a qualified majority
2 A blocking minority could be formed by four Member States.
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Annex 2.5
Illustration of the "weighted" dual majority system
In this illustration the two conditions needed for a qualified majority are:
• a "weighted" majority of Member States on the basis of an extrapolation of the current
weightings, and
• a minimum population threshold of 58.2% 1
Union of 28 Member States
Votes
(Annex 2.2)
Population
weight
(Annex 2.3)
% of votes
Minimum number
(and %) of
Member States
minimum %
of the
population
Qualified
majority 2
102 AND 582
70,83% 14 (50,00%)
58,2%
Blocking
minority
43 OR 419
29,86% 4 (14,29%)
10,45%
Union of 27 Member States
Votes
(Annex 2.2)
Population
weight
(Annex 2.3)
% of votes
Minimum
(and %) of
Member
States
minimum
% of the
population
Qualified majority 102 AND 582 70,83% 14 (50,00%) 58,2%
Blocking minority 43 OR 419 29,86% 4 (14,29%) 10,45%
                                                
1 i.e. the minimum population currently represented by a qualified majority.
2 In both cases illustrated a qualified majority will always include a majority of Member States.
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Annex 2.6
First illustration of possible reweighting in favour of
the most populated Member States
The assumptions on which this illustration is based are described in Chapter 2, page22
MEMBER STATE VOTES
Germany 25
Turkey 25
United Kingdom 25
France 25
Italy 25
Spain 20
Poland 20
Romania 12
Netherlands 12
Greece 10
Czech Republic 10
Belgium 10
Hungary 10
Portugal 10
Sweden 8
Bulgaria 8
Austria 8
Slovakia 6
Denmark 6
Finland 6
Ireland 6
Lithuania 6
Latvia 3
Slovenia 3
Estonia 3
Cyprus 3
Luxembourg 3
Malta 3
TOTAL EU of 28 311
TOTAL EU OF 27 (without Turkey) 286
Union of 28 Member States
Total votes = 311 Votes % votes Minimum number (and %) of
Member States
Minimum % of
population
Qualified majority 222 71,38% 13 (46,42%) 58,18%
Blocking minority 90 28,94% 4 (14,29%) 13,93%
Union of 27 Member States
Total votes = 286 Votes % votes Minimum No (and %) of
Member States
Minimum % of
population
Qualified majority 204 71,33% 11 (40,74%) 57,26%
Blocking minority 83 29,02% 4 (14,81%) 13,95%
Part II – Annexes to Chapter 2: Weighting of votes in the Council
CONFER 4750/00 ory/MS/fc 70
DQPG EN
Annex 2.7
Second illustration of possible reweighting in favour of
the most populated Member States
The assumptions on which this illustration is based are described in Chapter 2, page22
MEMBER STATE VOTES
Germany 25
Turkey 25
United Kingdom 25
France 25
Italy 25
Spain 21
Poland 21
Romania 12
Netherlands 10
Greece 10
Czech Republic 10
Belgium 10
Hungary 10
Portugal 10
Sweden 8
Bulgaria 8
Austria 8
Slovakia 6
Denmark 6
Finland 6
Ireland 6
Lithuania 6
Latvia 6
Slovenia 6
Estonia 6
Cyprus 4
Luxembourg 4
Malta 4
TOTAL EU of 28 323
TOTAL EU of 27 (without Turkey) 298
Union of 28 Member States
Total votes = 323 Votes % votes Minimum number (and %)
of Member States
Minimum % of
population
Qualified majority 231 71,52% 11 (39,28%) 58,04%
Blocking minority 93 28,79% 4 (14,29%) 12,08%
Union of 27 Member States
Total votes = 298 Votes % votes Minimum No (and %) of
Member States
Minimum % of
population
Qualified majority 214 71,81% 14 (51,85%) 56,54%
Blocking minority 85 28,52% 4 (14,81%) 11,85%
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Annex 2.8
Illustration of possible reweighting
based on an arithmetical approach
The assumptions on which this illustration is based are described in Chapter 2, page 22
MEMBER STATE VOTES
Germany 18
Turkey 16
United Kingdom 15
France 15
Italy 15
Spain 13
Poland 12
Romania 9
Netherlands 8
Greece 6
Czech Republic 6
Belgium 6
Hungary 6
Portugal 6
Sweden 6
Bulgaria 6
Austria 6
Slovakia 5
Denmark 5
Finland 5
Ireland 4
Lithuania 4
Latvia 3
Slovenia 3
Estonia 2
Cyprus 2
Luxembourg 1
Malta 1
TOTAL EU of 28 204
TOTAL EU of 27 (without Turkey) 188
Union of 28 Member States
Total votes = 204 Votes % votes Minimum number (and %)
of Member States
Minimum % of
population
Qualified majority 146 71,57% 14 (50%) 58,18%
Blocking minority 59 28.92% 4 (14,29%) 12,08%
Union of 27 Member States
Total votes = 188 Votes % votes Minimum number (and %)
of Member States
Minimum % of
population
Qualified majority 134 71,28% 14 (51,85%) 56,19%
Blocking minority 55 29,26% 4 (14,81%) 12,91%
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ANNEXES TO CHAPTER 3
EXTENSION OF QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING
Annex 3.1 Provisions worth examining with a view to a possible move to qualified
majority voting
Annex 3.2 Tax provisions
Annex 3.3 Social provisions
Annex 3.4 Environment provisions
Annex 3.5 External economic relations
− Mixed agreements
− European Union participation in WTO proceedings
Annex 3.6 Provisions in areas currently covered by Article 308 TEC
− Economic, financial and technical cooperation with
non-developing third countries
− Establishment of decentralised agencies
Annex 3.7 Constitutional, quasi-constitutional or organic provisions for which
unanimity is required in the Council
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Annex 3.1
Provisions worth examining
with a view to a possible move to qualified majority voting
A.  Provisions which could be considered for qualified majority voting as they stand
1. Appointment of CFSP special representatives (Article 23 TEU)
2. Conclusion of CFSP international agreements in areas in which a joint action has been
adopted by a qualified majority (Article 24 TEU)
3. Anti-discrimination measures (Article 13 TEC)
4. Provisions facilitating the exercise of the right of citizens of the Union to move and reside
within the territory of the Member States (Article 18(2) TEC)
5. The taking-up of and pursuit of activities as self-employed persons; the amendment in one or
more Member States of the existing principles laid down by law governing the professions
(Article 47(2) TEC)
6. The procedures and conditions for issuing visas by Member States and rules on a uniform visa
(Article 62(2)(ii) and (iv) TEC)
7. Measures on asylum (Article 63(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) TEC)
16. Measures on refugees and displaced persons (Article 63(2)(a) and (b) TEC)
17. Measures on immigration policy (Article 63(3)(a) and (b) TEC)
18. Measures defining the rights and conditions under which nationals of third countries who are
legally resident in a Member State may reside in other Member States (Article 63(4) TEC)
19. Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications,
and insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market (Article 65 TEC)
20. Measures to ensure cooperation between the relevant departments of the administrations of
the Member States, and between those departments and the Commission, in the areas covered
by Title IV (Article 66 TEC)
21. Derogations from the normal procedure when the application of the principles of the
regulatory system for transport is liable to have a serious effect on the standard of living and
employment in certain areas and on the operation of transport facilities (Articles 71(2)
and 80(2), second subparagraph, TEC, concerning sea and air transport)
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22. Directives for the approximation of laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the
Member States which directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market
(Article 94 TEC) 1
23. The economic measures to be taken in the case of difficulties in the supply of certain products
(Article 100(1) TEC)
24. Community financial assistance, under certain conditions, to a Member State which is in
difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by exceptional
occurrences beyond its control (Article 100(2) TEC)
25. Conclusion of international agreements on intellectual property and services (Article 133(5)
TEC) 2
26. Incentive measures, excluding harmonisation, in the cultural field (Article 151(5) TEC) 3
27. Measures supporting the action of Member States in the industrial sphere
(Article 157(3) TEC)
28. Specific action for economic and social cohesion other than through the Structural Funds
(Article 159, third paragraph, TEC)
29. Rules applicable to the Structural Funds and to the Cohesion Fund (Article 161 TEC)
30. Association of the overseas countries and territories (Article 187 TEC)
31. Approving the adoption of the statute for Members of the European Parliament
(Article 190(5) TEC)
32. Appointment of the Secretary-General of the Council (Article 207(2) TEC)
33. Appointment of the Deputy Secretary-General of the Council (Article 207(2) TEC)
34. The Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance (Article 225(4) TEC) 4
35. The Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice (Article 245(3) TEC) 4
36. Appointment of members of the Court of Auditors (Article 247(3) TEC)
                                                
1 If all the tax aspects are to be covered by Article 93 (see Annex 3.2 below).  Deletion of this Article could also
be considered.
2 See also Chapter 3 of Part I, page 30, and Annex 3.5 below.
3 One delegation has made a drafting suggestion for this Article (see CONFER 4742/00).
4 Subject to the transfer of certain sensitive material from the Rules of Procedure to the Statute of the Court of
Justice and the Court of First Instance (see Chapter 5 of this report).
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37. Financial Regulation (Article 279 TEC)
38. Compilation of the list of dual-use goods (Article 296(2) TEC)
39. Association agreements (Article 310 TEC) covering areas in which internal rules must be
adopted by a qualified majority
o
o o
B. Provisions for which a move to qualified majority voting could be considered
only for certain specific aspects (see Annexes below)
40. Establishment of decentralised agencies (new Article 7(3) TEC) 1
41. Measures necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers and self-employed workers
(Article 42 TEC) 2
42. Certain clearly circumscribed tax measures (Article 93(2) TEC) 3
43. Measures necessary for mutual assistance and cooperation between tax authorities
(Article 93(4) TEC) 3
44. Certain specific provisions on social matters (Article 137(1) TEC) 2
45. Economic, financial and technical cooperation with non-developing third countries (new
Article 181a TEC) 1
46. Conclusion of mixed agreements (new Article 300(8) TEC) 4
47. Arrangements for participation by the European Union in WTO proceedings (new Protocol) 4
o
o o
The corresponding provisions of the ECSC and EAEC Treaties would be amended accordingly.
                                                
1 See Annex 3.6 below.
2 See Annex 3.3 below.
3 See Annex 3.2 below.
4 See Annex 3.5 below.
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Annex 3.2
Tax provisions
Draft amendment to Article 93 1
1. The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt provisions
concerning the laws and regulations of Member States on direct and indirect taxation to
the extent that such provisions are necessary to ensure the establishment and the functioning
of the internal market [phrase deleted].
2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1 and without prejudice to paragraph 3, the
Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt:
− measures concerning value added tax, excise duties and capital duty which
modernise or simplify existing Community rules or ensure uniform, simple and
transparent application of such existing rules;
− measures concerning indirect taxation for the sole purpose of preventing
fraud, tax evasion and circumvention of existing rules;
− measures which have protection of the environment as their sole objective.
                                                
1 If Article 93 is to contain all the tax provisions, a move to QMV could be considered for Article 94 (see Annex
3.1, point 14).
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3. The measures referred to in the first and second indents of paragraph 2 shall not affect:
− in the case of value added tax, rules concerning the location of transactions,
the reallocation of VAT revenue between Member States, the determination of
rates and rules which do not in themselves constitute an obstacle to the functioning
of the internal market;
− in the case of excise duties, rules concerning the place of taxation or the fixing
of rates.
4. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and
after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt provisions necessary
for mutual assistance and cooperation between tax authorities within the Community
with a view in particular to combating fraud and tax evasion and to recovery of tax
claims.
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Annex 3.3
Social provisions
Article 42
The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, shall adopt such
measures in the field of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for
workers, including self-employed workers; to this end it shall make arrangements to secure for
migrant workers, including self-employed migrant workers, and their dependants:
(a) aggregation, for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit and of calculating
the amount of benefit, of all periods taken into account under the laws of the several
countries;
(b) payment of benefits to persons resident in the territories of Member States.
[Sentence deleted]
Part II – Annexes to Chapter 3: Extension of qualified majority voting
CONFER 4750/00 80
DQPG EN
Article 137
1. With a view to achieving the objectives of Article 136, the Community shall support and
complement the activities of the Member States in the following fields:
− improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers' health
and safety;
− working conditions;
− the information and consultation of workers;
− representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and
employers;
− the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, without prejudice to
Article 150;
− equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and
treatment at work;
− the conditions for granting unemployment benefit where an employment
contract is terminated;
− financial contributions for promotion of employment and job creation,
without prejudice to the provisions relating to the Social Fund.
Draft declaration to be adopted by the Conference
"It is to be understood that any expenditure incurred by virtue of the last indent of Article 137(1)
of the Treaty establishing the European Community will be charged to heading 3 of the financial
perspective."
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2. To this end, the Council may adopt, by means of directives, minimum requirements for
gradual implementation, having regard to the conditions and technical rules obtaining in each
of the Member States.  Such directives shall avoid imposing administrative, financial and
legal constraints in a way which would hold back the creation and development of small and
medium-sized undertakings.
The Council shall act in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 after
consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
The Council, acting in accordance with the same procedure, may adopt measures designed to
encourage cooperation between Member States through initiatives aimed at improving
knowledge, developing exchanges of information and best practices, promoting innovative
approaches and evaluating experience in order to combat social exclusion.
3. However, the Council shall act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, after
consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions, in the following areas:
− social security and social protection of workers;
− protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated, without
prejudice to the seventh indent of paragraph 1;
− [phrase deleted] co-determination [phrase deleted];
− conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in
Community territory; 1
[indent deleted]
                                                
1 The question arose of whether, for the sake of consistency, this indent should not be transferred to Article 63(3)
as subparagraph (c), if appropriate, with its wording adjusted.
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4. A Member State may entrust management and labour, at their joint request, with the
implementation of directives adopted pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3.
In this case, it shall ensure that, no later than the date on which a directive must be transposed
in accordance with Article 249, management and labour have introduced the necessary
measures by agreement, the Member State concerned being required to take any necessary
measure enabling it at any time to be in a position to guarantee the results imposed by that
directive.
5. The provisions adopted pursuant to this Article shall not prevent any Member State from
maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures compatible with this Treaty.
6. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike
or the right to impose lockouts.
Article 144
[Deleted]
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Annex 3.4
Environment provisions
Article 175(2)
2. By way of derogation from the decision-making procedure provided for in paragraph 1 and
without prejudice to Article 95, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt measures significantly affecting:
[indent deleted] 1
− town and country planning, management of the quantitative aspects of water
resources and land use with the exception of waste management [phrase deleted];
− a Member State's choice between different energy sources and the general
structure of its energy supply.
The Council may, under the conditions laid down in the preceding subparagraph, define those
matters referred to in this paragraph on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified
majority.
                                                
1 See Annex 3.2 – Article 93(2), 3rd indent.
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Annex 3.5
External economic relations
Mixed agreements
Draft new paragraph 8 of Article 300 TEC
8. Where it is planned to conclude an agreement in which only some provisions come
within the Community's powers, those provisions shall form a separate agreement,
concluded on the basis of the relevant provisions of this Treaty.
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European Union participation in WTO proceedings
Draft Protocol on arrangements for participation by the European Union
(European Community and Member States)
in WTO proceedings
Article 1
Participation by the European Union (European Community and Member States) in WTO
proceedings shall be governed by the rules in this Protocol.
Article 2
A single procedure shall apply in all cases, whether involving the exercise of Community
powers, the exercise of Member States' powers or the exercise of powers shared between the
Community and the Member States.
Article 3
1. The Commission shall act as the European Union's spokesman and sole negotiator and
shall present the Union's common position as established in accordance with this
Protocol.
2. In negotiations, the Commission shall act on the basis of prior authority from the
Council.  The Council may at any time give the Commission negotiating directives.
3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, the Council shall act by a qualified majority.
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Article 4
1. Member States may participate in all WTO meetings either directly or through the
Council Presidency, which shall be assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council.
2. The Commission shall ensure that the Member States and the Council Presidency are
informed in sufficient time of all WTO meetings to be held.
3. The Commission shall forward all documents available to it to the Member States and
the Council Presidency without delay.
4. The Commission shall at all times agree to a request by any Member State for
consultation on a position stated or to be stated on behalf of the Community and the
Member States.  If need be, the Commission shall ask to have the meeting adjourned in
order to meet such a request.
Article 5
1. The common position to be stated by the Commission at the WTO on behalf of the
European Union shall be established by the Council.
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the common position to be stated by the Commission at
the WTO on behalf of the European Union shall be established by the Committee
referred to in Article 133 of the Treaty where its purpose is to comment on WTO texts
which will not have any legal effect for the Community or for the Member States and no
delegation has asked for the matter to be referred to the Council.
Article 6
The European Union common positions referred to in Article 5 shall be established by a
qualified majority.
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Article 7
1. If a dispute settlement procedure is initiated at the WTO against one or more Member
States, the unity of the Union's representation must be upheld.
2. The Member State or Member States concerned shall be represented by the Commission
in the procedure, including before the Appellate Body.  The defence shall be prepared
by the Commission, in close cooperation with the States in question, with the Council
and the Committee referred to in Article 133 of the Treaty being kept fully informed.
3. The Member States concerned and the Commission shall make every effort to ensure
that WTO procedures do not result in the calling into question of advantages enjoyed by
the Community or by other Member States.
Article 8
1. Where a dispute settlement procedure is to be initiated against a third country
belonging to the WTO, the Commission shall, after consulting the Committee referred to
in Article 133 of the Treaty, hold the consultations provided for in the WTO
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.
2. A decision to request that the WTO establish a panel or to appeal against the report of
such a panel shall be taken by the Committee referred to in Article 133 of the Treaty, in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 6.
3. In a field coming within the powers of the Member States, if it is not possible to establish
a common position in accordance with Article 6 in order to request the establishment of
a panel at the WTO, a Member State may so request on its own behalf, save where the
Council has decided by a qualified majority against such a request.
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Annex 3.6
Areas currently covered by Article 308 TEC
Economic, financial and technical
cooperation with non-developing third countries
Draft new Title XXI – Relations with third countries
Draft new Article 181a
1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Title XX, the Community shall carry out
economic, financial et technical cooperation measures with third countries and shall
adopt, if necessary, measures to assist the balance of payments.
2. The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and
after consultation of the European Parliament, shall adopt the measures required for
implementation of paragraph 1.
3. The procedures for the cooperation referred to in paragraph 1 may be the subject of
agreements between the Community and the third countries concerned, which shall be
negotiated and concluded in accordance with Article 300.
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Establishment of decentralised agencies
Draft new paragraph 3 to be added to Article 7 TEC
3. Where this appears necessary in order to carry out any of the activities provided for in
Article 3, the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251,
shall establish an agency having legal personality and determine the rules applicable
thereto.
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Annex 3.7
Constitutional, quasi-constitutional or organic provisions
for which unanimity is required in the Council
1. Provisions in respect of which the Treaties expressly provide for the adoption of a
decision by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional rules:
– Common defence (Article 17(1), first subparagraph, TEU)
– Integration of the WEU (Article 17(1), second subparagraph, TEU)
– Establishment of PJC Conventions (Article 34(2) TEU)
– Communitarisation of PJC areas (Article 42 TEU)
– Revision of the Treaties (Article 48 TEU)
– Accession of a new Member State (Article 49 TEU)
– Additional rights of citizenship (Article 22 TEC)
– Uniform electoral procedure (Article 190(4) TEC)
– Own resources (Article 269 TEC)
2. Provisions which, in view of the sui generis character of the European Union, may be
considered "quasi-constitutional":
– Replacement of the provisions of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure
(Article 104(14) TEC)
– Amendment of the Statute of the ESCB without a proposal from the ECB
(Article 107(5) TEC)
– Committee procedure (Article 202 TEC)
– Decision on the order of the Presidency of the Council (Article 203 TEC)
– Alteration of the number of Members of the Commission (Article 213(1) TEC)
– Number of Judges and Advocates-General (Articles 221(4), 222(3) and 223(1) TEC)
– New classes of action before the CFI (Article 225 TEC)
– Statute of the Court of Justice (Article 245(2) TEC)
– Amendment of Commission proposal (Article 250(1) TEC); Second co-decision reading
after a negative opinion from the Commission (Article 251(3) TEC); Commission's
prerogatives
– Language rules (Article 290 TEC)
3. Provisions allowing derogations from normal Treaty rules:
– Not charging CFSP and JHA operational expenditure to the EC budget (Articles 28(3)
and 41(3) TEU)
– Measures constituting a step back as regards the liberalisation of the movement of
capital to or from third countries (Article 57 TEC)
– Measures constituting a step back as regards transport (Article 72 TEC)
4. Provisions in respect of which the rule of unanimity ensures consistency between
internal and external decisions:
– Conclusion of international agreements unanimously in areas which have been the
subject of a joint action adopted unanimously (Article 24 TEU)
– Conclusion of international agreements unanimously in areas in which unanimity is
required for the adoption of internal rules (Article 300(2) TEC)
________________________
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ANNEXES TO CHAPTER 4
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Annex 4.1 Table showing allocation of seats based on a linear reduction of the
current model 1
Annex 4.2 Table showing allocation of seats based on the European Parliament
method of calculation 1
Annex 4.3 List of legislative provisions which might be considered for extending
co-decision
Annex 4.4 List of provisions currently specifying the cooperation procedure, to
be replaced by the simple consultation procedure or by co-decision
Annex 4.5 Introduction into the Treaty of the notion of "legislative act"
                                                
1 These tables show the situation for a Union of 28 (including all the States with applicant status) and for a Union
of 27 (including only those applicant States with which accession negotiations have actually begun).
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Annex 4.1
Table showing allocation of seats based on a straightforward linear reduction 1
MEMBER STATES POPULATION/000
EP SEATS
EU of 28
EP SEATS
EU of 27
Germany 82 038 71 77
Turkey 2 64 385 64 –
United Kingdom 59 247 62 69
France 58 966 62 69
Italy 57 612 62 69
Spain 39 394 46 51
Poland 38 667 46 51
Romania 22 489 32 35
Netherlands 15 760 23 25
Greece 10 533 18 20
Czech Republic 10 290 18 20
Belgium 10 213 18 20
Hungary 10 092 18 20
Portugal 9 980 18 20
Sweden 8 854 16 18
Bulgaria 8 230 15 17
Austria 8 082 15 17
Slovakia 5 393 12 13
Denmark 5 313 12 13
Finland 5 160 12 13
Ireland 3 744 11 12
Lithuania 3 701 11 12
Latvia 2 439 7 8
Slovenia 1 978 7 7
Estonia 1 446 6 6
Cyprus 752 6 6
Luxembourg 429 6 6
Malta 379 6 6
TOTAL EU of 28 545 566 700 -
TOTAL EU of 27 481 181 700
                                                
1 Reducing by 1/3 the seats allocated to each Member State and allocating additional seats (between 1 and 5) to
Member States, according to the number of inhabitants above 3 million.
2 Estimated figures cited in the Commission's opinion (source: national/IMF).
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Annex 4.2
Table showing allocation of seats in a Union of 28,
based on the European Parliament method of calculation
MEMBER STATES POPULATION/000
EP SEATS
EU of 28
EP SEATS
EU of 27
Germany 82 038 92 104
Turkey1 64 385 73 –
United Kingdom 59 247 68 77
France 58 966 68 77
Italy 57 612 66 75
Spain 39 394 46 52
Poland 38 667 46 51
Romania 22 489 28 32
Netherlands 15 760 21 23
Greece 10 533 15 17
Czech Republic 10 290 15 17
Belgium 10 213 15 17
Hungary 10 092 15 16
Portugal 9 980 15 16
Sweden 8 854 14 15
Bulgaria 8 230 13 14
Austria 8 082 13 14
Slovakia 5 393 10 11
Denmark 5 313 10 11
Finland 5 160 10 10
Ireland 3 744 8 9
Lithuania 3 701 8 9
Latvia 2 439 7 7
Slovenia 1 978 6 6
Estonia 1 446 6 6
Cyprus 752 4 5
Luxembourg 429 4 5
Malta 379 4 4
TOTAL EU of 28 545 566 700 -
TOTAL EU of 27 481 181 700
                                                
1 Estimated figures cited in the Commission's opinion (source: national/IMF).
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Annex 4.3
List of TEC legislative provisions which might be considered for extending
co-decision 1
Asterisks denote provisions which are being considered by the Conference with a view to a possible
move to QMV
1. Establishment of decentralised agencies (draft new paragraph 3 to be added to Article 7
TEC) *
2. Action to combat discrimination (Article 13 TEC) *
3. Guidelines and conditions necessary to ensure balanced progress in all sectors of the internal
market (Article 14(3) TEC)
4. Extension of provisions on services to nationals of a third country who provide services and
who are established within the Community (Article 49 TEC)
5. Directives in order to achieve the liberalisation of a specific service (Article 52(1) TEC)
6. Measures on the movement of capital to or from third countries, involving direct investment,
establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to capital
markets (Article 57(2) TEC)
7. The procedures and conditions for issuing visas by Member States and rules on a uniform visa
(Article 62(2)(b)(ii) and (iv) TEC) *
8. Measures on asylum (Article 63(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) TEC) *
9. Measures on refugees and displaced persons (Article 63(2)(a) and (b) TEC) *
10. Measures on immigration policy (Article 63(3)(a) and (b) TEC) *
11. Measures defining the rights and conditions under which nationals of third countries who are
legally resident in a Member State may reside in other Member States (Article 63(4) TEC) *
                                                
1 It should be noted that a move to QMV in the Council is being suggested for the three provisions where
co-decision currently applies in conjunction with unanimity in the Council (Articles 18(2), 47(2) and 151(5))
(see Annex 3.1).
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12. Measures in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications,
insofar as necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market (Article 65 TEC) *
13. Measures to ensure cooperation between the relevant departments of the administrations of
the Member States, as well as between those departments and the Commission, in the areas
covered by Title IV (Article 66 TEC) *
14. Derogation from the normal procedure where the application of principles for the regulatory
system for transport would be liable to have a serious effect on the standard of living and
employment in certain areas and on the operation of transport facilities (Articles 71(2) and
80(2) TEC) *
15. Certain specific measures on taxation (draft new paragraph 2 to be added to
Article 93 TEC) *
16. Provisions necessary for mutual assistance, cooperation and exchange of information between
tax authorities within the Community with a view to combating fraud and tax evasion or
avoidance (draft new paragraph 4 to be added to Article 93 TEC) *
17. Directives for the approximation of laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the
Member States which directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market
(Article 94 TEC) 1 *
18. Minimum requirements regarding the representation and collective defence of the interests of
workers and employers, conditions for granting unemployment benefit and financial
contributions promoting employment and job creation (draft new provisions to be added to
Article 137(1) TEC) *
19. Specific measures in support of action taken by Member States in the industry sector
(Article 157(3) TEC) *
20. Specific measures for economic and social cohesion outside the Structural Funds (third
paragraph of Article 159 TEC) *
21. Rules governing the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund (Article 161 TEC) *
                                                
1 If all the tax aspects are to be covered by Article 93 (see Annex 3.2).
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Annex 4.4
List of TEC provisions currently specifying the cooperation procedure,
to be replaced by the simple consultation procedure or by co-decision
22. Adoption of detailed rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure (Article 99(5) TEC)
23. Prohibition on privileged access to financial institutions (Article 102(2) TEC)
24. Specifying definitions for the application of the prohibitions referred to in Article 101 and in
Article 103(1) (Article 103(2) TEC)
25. Harmonising the denominations and technical specifications of coins intended for circulation
(Article 106(2) TEC)
Article 252
[Deleted]
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Annex 4.5
Introduction into the Treaty of the notion of "legislative act"
Option 1
Draft amendment to Article 249 TEC
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty:
− the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council shall adopt legislative acts under
the procedure referred to in Article 251;
− the Council and the Commission shall make regulations, issue directives, take decisions, make
recommendations or deliver opinions.
A legislative act shall have general application.  Without prejudice to specific provisions in
this Treaty, it shall contain binding provisions which may either be binding in their entirety
and directly applicable in all Member States or be binding on the Member States as to the
result to be achieved, but leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.
Except where justified by the nature of the subject matter, it shall be confined to defining the
general principles, the objectives to be achieved and the essential elements of the measures to
be taken.  Where appropriate, and without prejudice to Article 202, the legislative act shall
provide that the principles, objectives and essential elements it has defined will be set out in
greater detail in acts adopted by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament.
[Remainder unchanged]
Draft amendment to Article 251(1)
1. Where reference is made in this Treaty to this Article for the adoption of an act, the following
procedure shall apply; the acts adopted in accordance with this procedure shall be legislative
acts as defined in Article 249.
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Draft addition to the beginning of Article 253 and to the beginning
of the first two paragraphs of Article 254
Legislative acts, [remainder unchanged]
Draft amendment to Article 207(3) 1
3. The Council shall adopt its Rules of Procedure.
For the purpose of applying Article 255(3), the Council shall elaborate in these Rules the
conditions under which the public shall have access to Council documents.  For the purpose
of this paragraph, the Council shall define the cases in which it is adopting legislative acts
with a view to allowing greater access to documents in those cases, while at the same time
preserving the effectiveness of its decision-making process.  In any event, when the Council
adopts legislative acts, the results of votes and explanations of vote as well as statements in
the minutes shall be made public.
Option 2
Draft amendment to Article 251(1)
1. Where reference is made in this Treat to this Article for the adoption of an act, the latter
shall, save where special provisions of this Treaty or the nature of the measures to be
taken so justify, be restricted to defining the general principles, the objectives to be
attained and the essential elements of the measures to be taken.  It shall be adopted in
accordance with the following procedure.
                              
                                                
1 If option 1 were adopted similar amendments would have to be made to other Treaty provisions, to replace
"legislative" by "normative" (see in particular the Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European
Union).
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ANNEXES TO CHAPTER 5
THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
Annex 5.1 Possible amendments to be made to the Treaty provisions relating to
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance
Annex 5.2 Possible amendments to be made to the Statute of the Court of Justice
Annex 5.3 Possible amendments to be made to the language provisions relating to
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance
Annex 5.4 Other amendments resulting from the removal of the Decision of
24 October 1988 (88/591/ECSC, EEC, EURATOM)
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Annex 5.1
Possible amendments to be made to the Treaty provisions relating to
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance
Draft amendment to Article 68 
Article 234 shall apply to this Title.  However, the Court of Justice shall not have jurisdiction
to rule on any measure or decision taken pursuant to Article 62(1), relating to the
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security.
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Draft amendment to Article 220 
The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is
observed.
A Court [of First Instance] shall be established alongside the Court of Justice.
[Autonomous] Boards of Appeal shall exercise judicial functions in certain specific areas.
Draft amendment to Article 221
Option A
The Court of Justice shall consist of a number of judges equal to the number of Member States.
The Court of Justice shall sit in plenary session or in chambers in accordance with the rules
laid down for that purpose in the Statute of the Court of Justice 1.
Option B
The Court of Justice shall consist of a number of judges equal to the number of Member States.
Except in cases where the Statute requires a plenary session, the Court of Justice shall sit in
one Grand Chamber, consisting of 13 judges, or in chambers.  The composition of the
chambers and the respective competence of these chambers and the Grand Chamber shall be
determined by the Statute.  In any event, the Grand Chamber shall sit whenever the President
deems it necessary or at the request of any Member State or Community institution party to
the proceedings.
                                                
1 It is understood that the Statute of the Court of Justice would have to provide henceforth for the formation of
chambers of 3 to 7 judges (or more).  There would also be a "Grand Chamber", which would consist of 11 to 15
judges and which would sit, inter alia, at the request of a Member State or an institution.  Furthermore, the same
exercise should be carried out to identify in the Statute those cases in which it would be appropriate for the
plenary assembly of judges to take decisions.
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Draft amendment to Article 222
The Court of Justice and the Court of [First Instance] shall be assisted by Advocates-General,
whose number shall be determined in the Statute.
It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to
make 1 reasoned submissions on certain cases brought before the Court of Justice or the Court
[of First Instance],
[in accordance with the conditions laid down by the Statute of the Court of Justice in order to
assist these bodies in the performance of their task.]
or
[which in the opinion of the Court of Justice or, if appropriate, the Court [of First Instance]
require their involvement.]
                                                
1 The question of public access to the conclusions of Advocates-General could be settled in the Statute, as is
already the case for judgments (see Article 34 of the Statute).
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Draft amendment to Article 223
1. The Judges and Advocates-General of the Court of Justice shall be chosen from persons
whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for
appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are
jurisconsults of recognised competence; they shall be appointed by common accord of the
governments of the Member States for a term of six years.
Every three years there shall be a partial replacement of the Judges and
Advocates-General, in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Statute.
Retiring Judges and Advocates-General shall be eligible for reappointment.
2. The Judges shall elect the President of the Court of Justice [and the presidents of the
five/seven judge chambers] from among their number for a term of three years.  The
President of the Court of Justice may be re-elected.
3. The members of the Court [of First Instance] shall be chosen from persons whose
independence is beyond doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment to
judicial office; they shall be appointed by common accord of the governments of the
Member States for a term of six years.  The membership shall be partially renewed
every three years.  Retiring members shall be eligible for reappointment.  The Statute
shall determine the composition of the Court [of First Instance].
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Draft amendment to Article 225
26. The Court [of First Instance] shall be competent to hear and determine at first instance
[classes of action or proceeding defined in accordance with the conditions laid down in
paragraph 3.]
or
[classes of direct action or proceeding referred to in this Treaty, with the exception of those
that the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure set out in paragraph 3, reserves
for the exclusive competence of the Court of Justice 1].
Decisions given by the Court [of First Instance] on such actions or proceedings may be
subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of law only, within the limits
and under the conditions laid down by the Statute.
The Court [of First Instance] shall be competent to hear and determine questions referred for
a preliminary ruling under Article 234, in matters to be defined [in certain specific
fields].
[In respect of those matters, the Court of Justice shall first consider whether a question
referred for a preliminary ruling raises an issue of general application or importance or
involves the unity and coherence of Community law.  If so, the Court of Justice shall itself
give the ruling.  Where a question does not raise such an issue, the President of the Court
of Justice shall transfer it to the Court [of First Instance] to give the ruling.]
or
[Decisions given by the Court [of First Instance] by way of preliminary ruling may be
subject to review by the Court of Justice, within the limits and under the conditions laid
down by the Statute].
3.2 The Council, acting unanimously at the request of the Court of Justice and after consulting the
European Parliament and the Commission, [or at the request of the Commission and after
consulting the European Parliament and the Court of Justice], shall determine the classes
of action or proceeding referred to in paragraph 1 and the matter(s) referred to in
paragraph 2.
Unless otherwise specified, the provisions of this Treaty relating to the Court of Justice
shall apply to the Court [of First Instance] and to the Boards of Appeal.
4. [Paragraph deleted, provisions inserted into Article 245.]
                                                
1 This alternative requires that a list now be drawn up to identify the actions and proceedings reserved for the
exclusive competence of the Court of Justice.
2 The current provisions of Article 225(3) have been inserted into Article 223.
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Draft new Article 225a
When, in specific fields, there is a sufficiently large amount of litigation, the Council may,
acting unanimously at the request of the Court of Justice and after consulting the European
Parliament and the Commission, or at the request of the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament and the Court of Justice, create judicial Boards of Appeal for
particular subjects.
Following the same procedure, the Council shall determine the composition of those judicial
Boards of Appeal and the way in which they function.
Decisions given by the Boards of Appeal may be subject to appeal before the Court [of First
Instance] on points of law only, within the limits and under the conditions laid down by the
Statute.
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Draft amendment to Article 236 1
A judicial Board of Appeal shall have jurisdiction in any dispute between the Community and
its servants under the conditions laid down in the Staff Regulations of Officials or the
Conditions of Employment of other servants.
The composition and the operating procedures of that Board of Appeal shall be determined
by the Council, acting unanimously at the request of the Court of Justice [or of the
Commission] and after consulting the other institutions [and bodies] concerned.
The decisions of the Board may be subject to appeal to the Court [of First Instance] on points
of law only, within the limits and under the conditions laid down by the Statute of the Court
of Justice.
                                                
1 Some delegations raised the question of merging the provisions of this draft Article 236 and those of
Article 225a in a single Article.
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Draft amendment to Article 245
1. The Statute of the Court of Justice is laid down in a separate Protocol.
The Council may, acting unanimously at the request of the Court of Justice and after
consulting the European Parliament and the Commission, [or at the request of the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the Court of Justice],
amend the provisions of the Statute, with the exception of Title I thereof.
2. The Court of Justice shall adopt its Rules of Procedure.  Those rules shall require the approval
of the Council acting by a qualified majority after consulting the European Parliament
and the Commission.
3. The Court [of First Instance] shall adopt its Rules of Procedure.  Those rules shall
require the approval of the Council acting by a qualified majority after consulting the
European Parliament and the Commission.
Draft amendment to Article 290
The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, without prejudice to
the provisions contained in the Statute of the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting
unanimously.
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Annex 5.2
Possible amendments to be made to the Statute of the Court of Justice
1. Languages:
(a) Articles 29 and 30 of the CJEC Rules of Procedure
Transfer to the Statute
(b) Article 104(1) of the CJEC Rules of Procedure
Transfer to the Statute
(c) Article 131 of the Rules of Procedure of the CFI
Transfer to the Statute
2. Article 46(1)
Delete "with the exception of Article 20"
3. Include a new Article 44 relating to the CFI
Aim: remove Decision of 24/10/1998 (88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom), Article 2
4. Include a new Article 45a relating to the CFI
Aim : remove Decision of 24/10/1998 (88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom), Article 3
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Annex 5.3
Possible amendments to be made to the language provisions relating to the Court of
Justice and the Court of First Instance
1. EC Treaty – Article 290 (rules governing languages)
Include the reference to the Statute by adding:
"(…), without prejudice to the provisions laid down in the Statute of the Court of
Justice, (…)"
2. Articles 29 and 30 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice
Transfer to the Statute (authorised languages of all proceedings)
(Remove Articles 35 and 36 from the Rules of Procedure of the CFI)
3. Article 104(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice
Transfer to the Statute (authorised languages for referrals for a preliminary ruling)
4. Article 131 of the Rules of Procedure of the  Court of First Instance
Transfer to the Statute (authorised languages of litigation on intellectual property,
trademarks and plant varieties)
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Annex 5.4
Other amendments resulting from the removal of the
Decision of 24 October 1988 (88/591/ECSC, EEC, EURATOM)
1. Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Communities – Article 21
Add: "(…) and to the members and the Registrar of the Court of First Instance".
2. EC Treaty – Article 210 (salaries, allowances and pensions)
Add: "(…) of the Registrar of the Court  of Justice and the Registrar of the Court of First
Instance".
________________________
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ANNEXES TO CHAPTER 6
OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES
Annex 6.1 1 Linear extrapolation based on the current system of allocating seats on
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions
Annex 6.2 1 Linear reduction in the number of members of the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions to comply with a
maximum limit of 250 members
Annex 6.3 Composition of the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions
                                                
1 These tables show the situation for a Union of 28 (including all the States with applicant status) and for a Union
of 27 (including only those applicant States with which accession negotiations have actually begun).
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Annex 6.1
Linear extrapolation based on the current system of allocating seats
on the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
MEMBER STATES POPULATION/000 SEATS
Germany 82 038 24
Turkey 64 385 24
United Kingdom 59 247 24
France 58 966 24
Italy 57 612 24
Spain 39 394 21
Poland 38 667 21
Romania 22 489 15
The Netherlands 15 760 12
Greece 10 533 12
Czech Republic 10 290 12
Belgium 10 213 12
Hungary 10 092 12
Portugal 9 980 12
Sweden 8 854 12
Bulgaria 8 230 12
Austria 8 082 12
Slovakia 5 393 9
Denmark 5 313 9
Finland 5 160 9
Ireland 3 744 9
Lithuania 3 701 9
Latvia 2 439 8
Slovenia 1 978 8
Estonia 1 446 8
Cyprus 752 6
Luxembourg 429 6
Malta 379 6
TOTAL EU of 28 545 566 372
TOTAL EU of 27 481 181 348
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Annex 6.2
Linear reduction in the number of members of the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
to comply with a maximum limit of 250 members
MEMBER STATES POPULATION/000
SEATS
EU of 28
SEATS
EU of 27
Germany 82 038 16 17
Turkey 64 385 16 -
United Kingdom 59 247 16 17
France 58 966 16 17
Italy 57 612 16 17
Spain 39 394 14 15
Poland 38 667 14 15
Romania 22 489 10 11
Netherlands 15 760 8 9
Greece 10 533 8 9
Czech Republic 10 290 8 9
Belgium 10 213 8 9
Hungary 10 092 8 9
Portugal 9 980 8 9
Sweden 8 854 8 9
Bulgaria 8 230 8 9
Austria 8 082 8 9
Slovakia 5 393 6 6
Denmark 5 313 6 6
Finland 5 160 6 6
Ireland 3 744 6 6
Lithuania 3 701 6 6
Latvia 2 439 5 6
Slovenia 1 978 5 6
Estonia 1 446 5 6
Cyprus 752 4 4
Luxembourg 429 4 4
Malta 379 4 4
TOTAL EU of 28 545 566 247 -
TOTAL EU of 27 481 181 - 250
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Annex 6.3
Composition of the Economic and Social Committee
Draft amendment to Article 257
An Economic and Social Committee is hereby established.  It shall have advisory status.
The Committee shall consist of representatives of the various economic and social components of
organised civil society.
Its composition must take account of the need to ensure adequate representation of the various
categories and the public interest.
Composition of the Committee of the Regions
Draft amendment to Article 263
A Committee consisting of representatives of regional and local bodies who either hold a regional
or local authority electoral mandate or are politically accountable to an elected assembly,
hereinafter referred to as "the Committee of the Regions", is hereby established with advisory
status.
The number of members of the Committee of the Regions shall be as follows: (…)
The members of the Committee and an equal number of alternate members shall be appointed for
four years by the Council acting [by a qualified majority] on proposals from the respective Member
States.  When the mandate on the basis of which they were proposed comes to an end, their
term of office on the Committee shall automatically terminate and they shall be replaced for
the remaining term under the same procedure.
Their term of office shall be renewable.  No member of the Committee shall at the same time be a
Member of the European Parliament.
[Fourth paragraph unchanged]
____________________
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ANNEXES TO CHAPTER 7
OTHER ISSUES
Annex 7.1 Draft new paragraph to be added at the beginning of Article 7 of the Treaty on
European Union
Annex 7.2 Establishment of the Community position in a body set up by an agreement with a
third country which is called upon to adopt decisions having legal effects
Annex 7.3 Other issues examined by the Conference
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Annex 7.1
Draft new paragraph to be added at the beginning of Article 7 of the TEU
x. In order to prevent a breach by a Member State of the principles mentioned in
Article 6(1), the Council, acting by a majority of nine tenths 1 of its members on a
proposal by one third of the Member States or by the Commission may, after obtaining
the assent of the European Parliament, determine the existence of the threat of such a
breach in a Member State and make an appropriate recommendation to the Member
State in question, after inviting the Government of that Member State to submit its
observations on the subject.
[Remainder unchanged]
                                                
1 In a Union comprising up to 20 Member States, this voting rule is equivalent to unanimity less 2 (including the
Member State concerned) and, in a Union comprising 21 States or more, to unanimity less 3 (including the
Member State concerned).
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Annex 7.2
Establishment of the Community position in a body set up by an agreement with a third
country which is called upon to adopt decisions having legal effects
Draft amendment to the second and third subparagraphs
of Article 300(2) TEC
By way of derogation from the rules laid down in paragraph 3, the same procedures shall apply for
a decision to suspend the application of an agreement, and for the purpose of establishing the
positions to be adopted on behalf of the Community in a body set up by an agreement [phrase
deleted], when that body is called upon to adopt decisions having legal effects, with the exception
of decisions supplementing or amending the institutional framework of the agreement.
The European Parliament shall be immediately and fully informed of any decision under this
paragraph concerning the provisional application or the suspension of agreements, or the
establishment of the Community position in a body set up by an agreement [phrase deleted].
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Annex 7.3
Other issues examined by the Conference
• Simplification of the Treaties
Allocation of powers between the Union/Community and the Member States
• Endowing the Union with legal personality
• Accession of the Union or of the Community to the Council of Europe's European Convention
on Human Rights
• Creation of a legal basis establishing a European prosecutor responsible for the investigation
and prosecution of fraud offences at Community level
• Provisions to intensify the fight against fraud and protection of the Community's financial
interests
• The question of the expiry of the ECSC Treaty in 2002
• Development of certain Community policies more directly connected to European citizens'
interests
• The general problem of the hierarchy of norms
                                                  
